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THE GROWTH OF THE LONG ARM:
EIGHT YEARS OF EXTENDED
JURISDICTION IN ILLINOIS
BY DAVID P. CURRIE*
"Wheresoever a man soweth, there shall he also reap."
-The Illinois GeneralAssembly
FOR MANY YEARS, the judicial power of Illinois, like that of the other
states, suffered partial paralysis from the baneful influence of the territorialist theory expressed in Pennoyer v. Neff: "Process from the tribunals
of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them." '
In 1955, however, encouraged by a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions permitting the States wide latitude in effectuating their legitimate
interests through the assertion of jurisdiction in personam, the Illinois legislature enacted the present section 17 of the Civil Practice Act,2 based upon
the bold principle that one should be amenable to suit in Illinois on any
cause of action arising out of certain activities within this State. The time is
ripe for an evaluation of this provision in the light of eight years' experience.
DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The notion that a State deprives a person of property without due
process of law by entering a judgment against him in the absence of personal jurisdiction is an interesting one. I put to one side the obvious and
entirely distinct principle, so often confused with the problem of personal
jurisdiction, that a fair hearing requires timely notice reasonably calculated
to inform the defendant of the proceedings against him.3 In addition to this
requirement the Supreme Court has consistently held, ever since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, that the due process clause limits the
power of a State to enter a judgment against a defendant not found within,
or in some other relation to, the forum State. This restriction, the Court has
DAVID P. CURRIE. A.B. 1957, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1960,
Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

195 U.S. 714, 727 (1878).

2Ill. Laws 1955, pp. 2238, 2245-46, ILL. REv. STAT. C. 110, § 17 (1963).
3 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 70 Sup. Ct. 652
(1950).
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recently reaffirmed, is "a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States." 4 It has never been doubted, however, that
this limitation can be waived by the defendant.5 It is a limitation obviously
designed, or at least conceived in the present day, for the protection of the
defendant against another sort of unfairness in the procedure for reducing
his obligation to judgment: the unfairness, as it is conceived, of being compelled to defend himself in a court of a State with which he has no relevant
connection.
It does seem unfair to summon a New York resident to Hawaii to be
sued on an obligation unrelated to that State, although it is rather difficult
to formulate exactly why. Trial in a distant court may be inconvenient and
expensive, and may come as an unpleasant surprise; but trial in a federal
court in Hawaii would be as much so as trial in a state court there, and yet
the Supreme Court has declared that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, worded identically with that of the fourteenth, does not prevent Congress from providing for federal service of process anywhere in the
United States.6 Moreover, it is likely to be much more inconvenient and
expensive for a resident of Texarkana, Texas, to defend a suit in El Paso,
900 miles way, than just across town in Texarkana, Arkansas. But the Court
has never suggested either that due process forbids trial in an inconvenient
part of the proper State or that the convenience of a court in a nearby sister
State justifies trial there.7 In part, this may indicate that state boundaries
serve as rough indicia of hardship in preference to an unwieldly ad boc
determination. But it also, especially in conjunction with the notion that
federal process may run nationwide, seems to mean that there is something
8
to the idea that restrictions on state sovereignty are involved.
A related restriction of state power, often enforced under the due
process clause in the past but more recently treated largely as an issue of
full faith and credit, is the constitutional limitation on choice of the governing law. As presently construed, both these clauses forbid determination of
a controversy on the basis of the law of a State with no interest in the case. 9
It is as arbitrary to determine the rights of New Yorkers acting in New

4

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 78 Sup. Ct. 1228, 1238 (1958).

5 See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAxv. L. Rxv.

909, 943,
993 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
6

Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442, 66 Sup. Ct. 242,
245 (1946) (dictum).
7 Compare the provision in 5 4(f) of the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for service of process on certain additional parties outside the forum State
but within 100 miles of the court.
8See Developments 924-25.
9 See B. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CI. L. REv. 9, 13-14, 75 (1958).
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York by Hawaiian law as it would be to determine their rights by a law
repealed before they acted; neither is consistent with due process of law.
In something of the same way, perhaps, a State lacks judicial as well as
legislative power over transactions and persons with which it has no relevant
connection. This parallel must not be carried too far, however. Not only
may there be situations, as the Court has pointed out, in which a State has
sufficient interest to justify application of its law but insufficient contacts to
permit it to exercise personal jurisdiction,' ° but under earlier views of the
requirements of due process in the fields of jurisdiction and choice of law
there must have been a great many cases in which jurisdiction could only be
obtained in a state with no power to apply its own law." Probably the most
that can be said in a general way is that due process embodies a test of
fundamental fairness in all steps of the proceedings; that our sense of fairness is outraged by certain assertions of jurisdiction on the part of States
unconnected with the parties or with the controversy; and that this sense
of unfairness stems partly from the inconvenience and expense involved,
partly from the idea of unfair surprise, partly from anticipation of an improper choice of law, and partly from more general notions of the limits of
a state's rightful sovereignty.
Pennoyer v. Neff'12 laid down the rule that, while a State had power to
assert jurisdiction over property within its borders, whether to determine
claims respecting the property or to apply it in satisfaction of an unrelated
obligation, it could render a judgment binding a defendant personally only
if he was physically present and served with process while in the forum
State. In the case of a foreign corporation, later decisions made clear that
it was not sufficient that process be served upon an agent of the company
within the State; the corporation must also have impliedly "consented" to
the exercise of jurisdiction, or have been constructively "present" in the
State, and the agent must be engaged in doing the corporation's business
when served. The test of corporate presence or consent was whether the
company was "doing business" within the forum State. 13

10 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 4, at 253, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1239-40.

"1 Jurisdiction required personal service on the defendant in the forum State,
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878), while for a time the due process clause
was thought to compel application of the law of the place where a contract had
been made. This in turn was held to be the place where it had been accepted, and
it was quite possible that one party to a contract concluded by mail had never

been there. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337 (1918).

U.S. 714 (1878).
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 US. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (1915); Green v. Chicago,

1295

13

B.&Q. Ry, 205 U.S. 530, 27 Sup. Ct. 595 (1907). See Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. CM. L.
REv. 569, 578-86 (1958); Developments 919-23.
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It was not long before this structure began to crumble. Milliken v.
Meyer 14 held that an absent defendant could be sued in the courts of the
state of his domicile. Hess v. Pawloski 15 held that a nonresident motorist
might be required to defend an action in the State in which his use of
an automobile had given rise to a cause of action. Henry L. Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman 16 held that service could be made on the agent of a nonresident securities dealer respecting obligations arising from transactions in
the forum State. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 7 the Supreme
Court discarded the theories of constructive presence and implied consent
and enunciated a new test for determining whether a State might obtain
personal jurisdiction consistently with due process: whether the defendant
corporation had certain "minimum contacts" with the forum State "such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "
Two decisions of the Court since InternationalShoe have given content
to these principles. The first was McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,',
in which the permissive policy of InternationalShoe was invoked to sustain
jurisdiction of a suit against a foreign insurance company which, without
ever sending agents into the forum State, had insured one of its residents.
The second, Hanson v. Denckla,19 denied jurisdiction over a nonresident
trustee whose sole contact with the forum State was by correspondence
with the settlor, who had moved there subsequent to establishment of the
trust: "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State . . . ." This principle is borne out by cases such as
Estin v. Estin,20 holding that a State to which one spouse has moved after
separation has no power to enter a judgment terminating support payments
to a nonresident spouse who has never entered the State. But Hanson and
Estin leave much latitude to the States beyond service of process on defendants found within their borders.
Illinois, in order to protect its interests within the latitude afforded by
21
InternationalShoe and other decisions, enacted the following statute:

1A311 US. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 339 (1940).

15274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
16294 U.S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553 (1935).

17326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
18355 U.S. 220, 78 Sup. Ct. 199 (1957).
19357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 Sup. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958).

1 334 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948).
416, 77 Sup. Ct. 1360 (1957).
2'Note 2 supra.

See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
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"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting."
Provision is made for personal service outside the State; causes of action
not arising from the enumerated acts are prohibited in actions under the
section; and existing means of obtaining jurisdiction are preserved.
Illinois was not the first State to assert jurisdiction over such matters.
As early as 1937, Maryland had provided for suits arising from contracts
made or acts done within the State, 22 and Vermont for suits arising from
contracts to be performed or torts committed "in whole or in part" there.2
Jurisdiction in suits arising from the ownership or use of real property
within the State originated in a 1937 Pennsylvania statute.2 4 The Uniform
Unauthorized Insurers Act, which provided for jurisdiction over those insuring residents of the forum State, had been promulgated in 1938 and
adopted in several States.2 5 But Illinois was the first State to enact a statute
comprehensively dealing with personal jurisdiction and frankly attempting
to occupy the entire field of its constitutional power under the recent
liberalization of the due process clause. Other States have followed suit.
Wisconsin's 1959 statute, 26 based on the same general principle as Illinois', is
more detailed and somewhat different; six states-Idaho, Maine, Montana,
and Washington-have adopted statutes based
New Mexico, New 2 York,
7
upon that of Illinois.

22

Md. Acts 1937, c. 504, 5 118, at 1057, now MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92(d)

(1957).
Laws 1937, No. 40, now VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958). Both the
2Vt.
Maryland and Vermont laws are limited to suits by residents against foreign
corporations.
24
Pa. Laws 1937, No. 558, now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 331 (1953).
25
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 308, S 5 (1938). E.g., ARK. STAT. S 66-244(a) (1957);
CAL. INS. CODE, §5 1610-20.

STAT. ANN. S 262.05 (Supp. 1963).
IDAbo CODE ANN. S 5-514 (Supp. 1963); M. Rnv. STAT. ANN. c. 112, S 21
(Supp. 1961); MONT. REv. CooEs ANN., S 93-2702-2B (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN.
2Wis.
27

S 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Cv. PRAC.

LAW

& RULES 1302 (1963); WASH. REV.

S 4.28.185 (1962).
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The Isolated Act in Illinois
At one time, the only means of acquiring jurisdiction in Illinois over
an individual defendant was to find him in the State.28 But in 1927 the Su-

preme Court of the United States, invoking the fiction of implied consent
and the State's strong interest in promoting safety on its highways, upheld
a Massachusetts statute recalling the nonresident motorist who had left the
State before he could be served. 29 Two years later Illinois, following this
example, enacted a statute constituting the Secretary of State as "agent" for
service of process on nonresident motorists in actions arising out of the
"use or operation" of vehicles on Illinois highways. 80
This statute was held to permit actions in contract as well as in tort; at
to permit suits by nonresident plaintiffs as well as by residents; 3 2 and, by a
construction more liberal than some courts were willing to adopt, to permit
suits against nonresidents who had "used" vehicles in the State by permitting
their agents to drive in Illinois. 33 It was amended to extend, retroactively,
to suits against residents of the State who had moved away after the cause
of action had arisen.3 4 But the limitations of the statute were evident. In
Brauer Mach. & Supply Co. v. ParkhillTruck Co.,25 plaintiff's employee had
been injured by the alleged negligence of defendant's driver in unloading defendant's truck. The employer paid workmen's compensation and sued as
subrogee. Because the unloading took place on private property, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the cause of action did not arise out of the operation or use of the truck on Illinois highways and thus that there was no
jurisdiction.
This has been changed by the enactment of section 17 to the Illinois

28

ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 2 (1929). Provision for service by leaving summons
at the defendant's residence in Illinois was added by the 1933 Practice Act § 13, IMI.
Laws 291933, at 788.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927). The Court had earlier
upheld the imposition of a fine on a nonresident for driving in the State without
appointing an agent for service of process. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37
Sup. Ct. 30 (1916).
30M. Laws 1929, at 646, I.L. REv. STAT. c. 95 , § 9-301 (1963).
31Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 IlM.App. 2d 126, 117 NE.2d 314 (1st Dist.
1953).
82 Ibid. Accord, State ex rel. Rush v. Circuit Court, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766
(1932).
33Jones v. Pebler, 371 IMI.309, 20 N.E.2d 592 (1939). Contra, e.g., O'Tier v. Sell,
252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624 (1930).
34 See Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 i1. 591, 114 NE.2d 686 (1953).
85 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943).
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Civil Practice Act. Nelson v. Miller,36 the first case to reach the Illinois
Supreme Court under this section, concerned almost identical facts. Defendant, in Wisconsin, sent his servant into Illinois to deliver a stove to plaintiff,
who was injured by the servant's alleged negligence in unloading the stove.
The court wisely rejected the suggestion that the merits of the action must
be determined in order to ascertain jurisdiction; the commission of a
"tortious act" was construed to mean the commission of an act tortious if
proved as alleged, not one proved to be tortious3 7 There is flexibility
enough in the language to permit this result, which simplifies the jurisdictional issue and avoids a double trial of the merits-a double trial which
certainly could not have been intended.3 8 The court also upheld application
of section 17 to an action arising out of an incident that had occurred before
its enactment, on the obviously correct ground that it simply established a
means of securing existing rights and could therefore be retroactively
applied without destroying any vested interests.8 9 In this holding the court
followed its own earlier decision regarding an amendment to the nonresident-motorist statute 40 and was squarely supported by the United States
4
Supreme Court decision in McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co. 1
The court in Nelson declared that the aim of section 17 was to assert
jurisdiction to the fullest constitutional extent. Reviewing the cases, it applied the minimum-contacts and fundamental-fairness test of International
Shoe to uphold the statute against due-process objections. Illinois had an
interest in affording a forum to redress wrongs against persons such as the
plaintiff, entitled to the State's protection; it was not unfair to summon the
defendant to return to a State into which he had sent his servant and where
the servant had caused an accident; the Illinois forum was a convenient one
42
for witnesses; and Illinois law would be applicable.
Thus Illinois joined Vermont 43 in upholding the jurisdiction of its

-1 I IM. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).

8

7 "An act or omission within the State, in person or by an agent, is a sufficient
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether or not the act or omission
gives rise to liability in tort." Id. at 393-94, 143 NE.2d at 681.
8
Worse still, the opposite holding would have required the plaintiff suing elsewhere on a default judgment to relitigate the merits, thus defeating the whole purpose
of the section. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. REv.
657, 659 (1959).
39 11 Ill. 2d at 382-83, 143 N.E.2d at 675-76.
4
oOgdon v. Gianakos, supra note 34. Accord, Gray v. Armijo, 70 N.M. 245, 372
P.2d 821 (1962). Some courts have taken a contrary view, e.g, Gillioz v. Kincannon,
213 Ark. 1010, 214 S.W2d 212 (1948); Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran, 206 F. Supp.
339 (SD. Miss. 1962).
4 355 U.S. 220, 224, 78 Sup. Ct. 199, 201-02 (1957).
42 11 IMI.
2d at 383-91, 143 N.E.2d at 676-80.
4
3Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A2d 664 (1951).
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courts over nonresident defendants entering the State, in person or by an
agent, and committing there acts alleged to be tortious. No showing of continuous activity in the State is required; a single tort is sufficient. Statutes in
Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, and West
Virginia, 44 as well as those of Wisconsin and the States which have adopted
the Illinois statute, 45 now provide for jurisdiction on the basis of a single
tort. Many of these are limited to suits against foreign corporations, 46 but
this is not constitutionally required. In cases such as Nelson, these laws have
been uniformly upheld. 47 Indeed, the constitutionality of this assertion of
jurisdiction, today, could only be doubted by those determined to oppose
the clear trend of the decisions. This situation is exactly that of the nonresident-motorist statutes, which were long ago upheld, except that the highways are not directly involved. It is now clear, if it was ever in doubt, that
the nonresident-motorist cases were not really based on "consent," but on
the interest of the forum State and the fairness of trial there to the defendant.48 In Hanson v. Denckla, the United States Supreme Court lent some

credence to the suggestion that these statutes depended for their validity
upon some special regulatory interest of the State over its highways, and
that both Henry L. Doherty v. Goodman,4 9 upholding jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual doing business in the state, and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 50 sustaining power over a corporation with isolated
rather than continuous contacts with the forum State, likewise rested upon
the fact that they concerned activities (the sale of securities and insurance)
in which the State had an unusual regulatory interest.5' But Hanson is

44CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 33-41(c) (4) (1960); IowA CoDE ANw. 5 617.3 (Supp.
1962); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, § 92(d) (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 303.13 (Supp.
1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-145(4) (1960); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 203lb(4) (Supp.
1960); W. VA. CODE S 3083 (1961). In addition, a number of States have enacted
nonresident tort statutes limited to the operation within the State of aircraft, e.g.,
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 422-A:18 (Supp. 1963), or watercraft, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
S 47.162 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. NAY. LAW § 74.
45
See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
46 Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Vermont, and West
Virginia.

47

E.g., Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn.

1960); Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 SE.2d 731 (1957).
48
ee Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341, 74 Sup. Ct. 83, 85,

(1953).
49 294 U.S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553 (1935).

50 355 U.S. 220, 78 Sup. Ct. 199 (1957).
51"This case is also different from McGee in that there the State had enacted

special legislation ... to exercise what McGee called its 'manifest interest' in providing
effective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an
activity that the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation. Cf.
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Com. of Virginia [also an insurance case] . .. ; Doherty &
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amply distinguishable from McGee on grounds other than a special interest
in insurance; 52 the significant fact in Hanson was the absence of any act by
which the defendant "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," 53 a condition obviously met
when the defendant has ordered his servant to enter the State to deliver a
stove. I can perceive no plausible basis for holding it fair to ask the defendant to return and defend a suit when he strikes a pedestrian with his truck,
but unfair to do so when he causes injury while unloading the truck. The
convenience or inconvenience and the expense of trial are identical in the
two cases; and, whatever may be said about a special interest in highway
safety or insurance or securities, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
no automobile is required to justify a State's interest in applying its laws to
secure compensation for residents 54 or even nonresidents injured within its
limits.55 This interest, coupled with a fair basis for calling on the defendant
to defend there, suffices to sustain jurisdiction under the modern test of
fairness, state interests, and minimum contacts. 56 Hess v. Pawloski is no
longer such a close case that a State interest of more than ordinary vitality
57
can be thought required.

Co. v. Goodman . . . ; Hess v. Pawloski

...

"

357 U.S. at 252-53, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1239,

See Note, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 544, 546.
52 See notes 101-10 infra and accompanying text.
357 U.S. at 253, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1240.
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp, 348 U.S. 66, 75 Sup. Ct. 166 (1954).
55 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413, 75 Sup. Ct. 804, 807 (1955); see 116 F.
Supp. 491, 498 (WD. Ark. 1953) for the facts.
1 See Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts,
50 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 599, 606-07 (1955); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249, 258-59 (1959); Note,
53
54

42 MitNx. L. REv. 909, 916-17 (1958).
5
TIn

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 Sup. Ct. 840 (1953), the Supreme Court
held that a Wisconsin court had no power, incidental to divorce, to enter an ex pare
custody decree against a woman who had recently moved from Wisconsin to Ohio,
leaving her husband behind. The Court seems rather to have assumed than to have
decided that Wisconsin had no personal jurisdiction over her: "[W]e have before
us the elemental question whether a court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody,
management .and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction
over her in personam." Id. at 533, 73 Sup. Ct. at 843. The Wisconsin statute under
which the suit had been brought, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.12, made reference only to
actions for divorce or annulment. Even if the case can be read to hold Wisconsin
could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction although the proceeding arose
out of the relationship between' husband and wife within the State (a holding which
I would disapprove), May is distinguishable in that a custody proceeding is not one,
strictly speaking, to enforce a liability arising. from activities in the State, but rather
one looking to a prospective arrangement. For authority that the commission of a
tort within the State by one then a resident is grounds for jurisdiction after the defendant has moved away, see Owens v..Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921
(1959).
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Following Nelson v. Miller, jurisdiction under the tort provision of
section 17 has been upheld in all cases in which the defendant or his agent
has physically entered the State and committed an act alleged to be tortious.
This has been so in the obvious cases of a nonresident motorist,58 of an airplane crash in Illinois, 59 and of a ship collision in waters subject to Illinois
jurisdiction.6" It has also been true in a suit for unfair competition in the
solicitation of plaintiff's customers by defendant in Illinois,6 1 and in an
action for fraud in connection with an oil transaction negotiated in Illinois.62
There can be no question of the correctness of these decisions. When an
Illinois resident is injured by tortious acts in Illinois, compensating him is
within the purpose of the Illinois law whether the injury is to person or to
pocketbook, and the nature of the wrong does not affect the issue of fairness
to the defendant.es Nor should it matter, in terms of the relevant policies,
whether the defendant in such a case is a natural person, a corporation, a
partnership, or some other entity, or whether, if an individual, he is acting
for profit or for pleasure.
The defendant in Nelson v. Miller was not himself in Illinois when the
alleged tort was committed; but his servant was. The Illinois Supreme
Court had already held that service could be made on an absent principal
under the nonresident-motorist law,6 4 and the United States Supreme Court
long ago upheld the application of New York law to hold an automobile
owner, who had loaned his car in New Jersey with express or implied permission to take it elsewhere, liable for an injury caused by the bailee's negligence in New York.6 5 The defendant can claim no unfairness when he has
knowingly sent his servant into the State.
In most of the cases of this type adjudicated to date under section 17,
the plaintiff has been an Illinois resident. Some of the single-tort statutes are

5s Star v. Rogalny, 162 F. Supp. 181 (ED. III. 1957).
59

Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (ND. l. 1958).
Riinc, Inc. v. Peddie, 195 F. Supp. 124 (ED. IMl.1961).
61
R.I.T.A. Chem. Corp. v. Malmstrom Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 954 (ND. Ill.
60

1962).
e2 Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 257 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1958); 287 F.2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1961).

e The Maine statute, patterned after the Illinois, limits itself to suits arising from
tortious acts "resulting in physical injury to person or property," rather pointedly
excluding cases such as fraud, unfair competition, and defamation. ME. Rav. STAT.
ANw. c. 112, S 21 (Supp. 1961). New York expressly excludes defamation cases, N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw & RuLS S 302(2) (1963), but the accompanying comment makes clear
that defamation from acts done in New York will often arise from the transaction
of business there.
"'Jones v. Pebler, supra note 33.
65 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599 (1933).
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expressly limited to suits by resident plaintiffs, 66 but the Illinois statute is
not, and the Illinois appellate court has held that nonresidents may sue under
the motorist statute.6 7 Doubtless the same will be held, generally, with respect to section 17; in at least one case under the new statute, the foreign
residence of the plaintiff was been ignored.68 In a personal-injury case, this
is clearly correct; as the appellate court said in dealing with an automobile
collision between two nonresidents, the State's interest in compensation as a
means of furthering highway safety may extend to nonresidents as well as
to residents. The Supreme Court of the United States has also recognized
the interest of the state of injury in securing a fund for the payment of local
doctors and other creditors.69 And certainly the convenience of witnesses
is as great, and the hardship on the defendant no greater, than if the plaintiff
resided in Illinois. But the nature of the cause of action may be important
when the plaintiff is a nonresident. It has been suggested, for example, that
the state of the accident, as such, has no interest in applying its wrongfuldeath law as between nonresidents.70 Illinois' unfair-competition law may
well express a policy of protecting nonresidents doing business here, but it
is not so certain, despite the common adherence to the rule that a tort action
is governed by the law of the place of wrong,7 ' that Illinois has any policy
of protecting transients from frauds committed by other transients and
affecting property located elsewhere. Fraud cases arising from contractual
dealings give rise to interests in some respects more akin to those of contract
than to those of tort, and, as I shall discuss below, 72 the place where a contract is made may not always have an interest in the outcome of litigation.
That this may also be true in some tort cases does not necessarily prove that
the assertion of jurisdiction, with the application of foreign law, would
offend due process. It does, however, remove the principal support for the
exercise of jurisdiction. It would not be unfair to the defendant to bring
him back to Illinois to defend if there were a good reason for doing so;

6 Connecticut (resident plaintiff or one with a "usual place of business" in the
State); Iowa; Maryland (same as Connecticut); Minnesota (but see note 73 infra);
North Carolina (same as Connecticut); Texas; and Vermont. See notes 23 and 44
supra.6 T
Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, supra note 31.
68
Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., supra note 59. In Riinc, Inc. v. Peddie,
supra note 60, the plaintiff's residence was not mentioned.
69 Carroll v. Lanza, supra note 55, at 413, 75 Sup. Ct. at 807 (even though the
injured man had been removed from the State without incurring any bills).
70
B. Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HtAv. L.

REv. 36, 44-48 (1959).
71RESTATEMEN-F, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). The new RESTATEMENT § 379
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), gets away from this rule, but not very far. See id.
comment b.
72 See text accompanying notes 225-33 infra.
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but there may be no such reason if the State has no interest in applying its
law, and especially in a fraud case where the only witnesses may be the nonresident parties themselves. It is therefore unfortunate that the statute is
phrased in terms simply of the commission of a tortious act in the State,
without reference to an Illinois interest in the outcome. The matter can be
handled, if necessary, by judicious use of forum non conveniens. But I am
aware of no decision of the United States Supreme Court permitting suit in
a state other than that in which the defendant is resident or present, in the
absence of an interest in the application of the forum State's law.73
Activities Outside the State Causing Injury Within
There has been a series of cases concerning the applicability of section
17 to a type of situation with Illinois connections perhaps less substantial
than Nelson v. Miller-cases in which injury has been caused in Illinois by
acts of the defendants outside the State. The first such decision was Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 74 Power Products Corporation manufactured
an engine in Wisconsin and sent it by independent carrier to Newark Stove
Co. in Ohio, where it was incorporated into a lawnmower and delivered to
Sears Roebuck, which later sold the lawnmower in Illinois. An Illinois child
was injured because of the allegedly negligent manufacture of the engine
in Wisconsin. The federal district court, while doubting that the assertion
of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional, construed the statutory reference
to the commission of a "tortious act" as expressing an intentional deviation
from the familiar choice-of-law rule that a tort is committed where the
last act necessary for liability-i.e., the injury-occurs, 75 and followed a
British decision that the commission of a tort "within the jurisdiction" for
purposes of service of process required the presence of the defendant within
the forum State at the time of the alleged tort.76 The Seventh Circuit Court

73

In Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962),
suit was against a foreign manufacturer in Minnesota for the death of a South Dakota
resident in an Indiana plane crash, although the suit was based on Indiana law. The
explicit limitation of the statute to suits for torts committed against Minnesota residents and on contracts with Minnesota residents, MINN. STAT. ANN. S 303.13, was
avoided by holding that the cause of action arose from a contract between the
manufacturer and the airline, a Minnesota resident, and that the decedent stood in
the shoes of the airline since the maker's warranties were for his benefit. Minnesota
law could probably have been applied to the case, since the airline's principal office
and much of its business was in Minnesota and the safety of all its passengers was
at stake. Cf. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl.
163 (1928). Moreover, the fact that a Minnesota defendant-the airline-was joined
might suffice to justify holding the entire suit there, since the manufacturer's activities within the State would sustain suit there if good reason were shown.
74157

F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).

75 Cf. Richards v.
76George Monro,

United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 Sup. Ct. 585 (1962).
Ltd v. American Cyanamid & Chem. Corp. [1944] 1 K.B. 432.
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of Appeals followed Hellriegel in two related but somewhat different cases.
In Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 77 the court ordered dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction an action for unfair competition based upon the fraudulent use of pictures of plaintiff's product in catalogs mailed into Illinois by
a defendant in New Jersey. Relying on Hanson v. Denckla and on the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 78 the court
held that no tort had been committed in Illinois because the defendant "did
not perform any act in the State of Illinois, tortious or otherwise." In
Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp.,79 the court of appeals upheld
Judge Miner's decision 0 that Illinois lacked personal jurisdiction over
out-of-State newspaper publishers which had mailed into the State copies
of newspapers containing material allegedly defamatory of the Illinois
plaintiff.
But in Gray v. American Radiator& Standard Sanitary Corp.,"' decided
after Hellriegel, Trippe, and Insull, the Illinois Supreme Court authoritatively construed section 17 to apply to a situation remarkably like that of
Hellriegel. Defendant manufactured a safety valve in Ohio and sold it to an
independent company outside Illinois; the valve was attached to a water
heater in Pennsylvania and sold later to an Illinois consumer. An Illinois
woman was injured in an explosion allegedly caused by the negligence of
the manufacturer in Ohio. Process was served in Cleveland. The supreme
court held that, in accordance with the traditional choice-of-law test, a
"tortious act" had been committed "in this State" because the injury occurred here.8 2 The test of the statute's scope, the court reaffirmed, was "the

extent permitted by the due-process clause," 8 and due process was not
violated by Illinois jurisdiction in this case. "As a general proposition, if a
corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is
not unjust to hold it answerable here for any damage caused by defects in
those products." "Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the
manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it
should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this

State."
77

84

Apparently agreeing with this assessment of the validity of the

270 F.2d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1959).

78 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 NE.2d 73 (1959) (discussed in text accompanying notes
194-219 infra).
79 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
66 172 'F. Supp. 615 (ND. I1. 1959).
8122 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
82 Id. at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63. The court also noted that a tort is committed for purposes of the statute of limitations when injury is suffered. Ibid.
83
Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
84 Id. at 442, 176 NE.2d at 766.
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statute as so applied, two federal district judges have since followed Gray
in similar fact situations."
The issue of the amenability of foreign manufacturers to suit for injuries arising from defective manufacture has been much considered. Connecticut, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wisconsin 81have explicitly provided
for jurisdiction in specified cases. There have been a number of decisions
on the subject under statutes such as that of Illinois respecting the commission of a tort within the State, and also under older provisions for jurisdiction over corporations doing business in the State of injury. The cases
with which I am concerned all deal with injuries arising out of defects created by acts outside the forum State; but several factual variations are
presented.
When the harmful product is sold by the defendant to a purchaser in
the state of injury as a result of continuous business activities,87 even continuous solicitation of orders,88 within that State, there is ample basis for
jurisdiction under the general doing-business statutes without regard to
where the alleged negligence took place. It has also been held, in cases
where there has been continuous solicitation, that a tort was committed in
the State,8s and the North Carolina Supreme Court has said that such a
case was just what the legislature had in mind in enacting its product-liability provision. 0 Similar sales resulting from isolated solicitation by an agent
of the defendant in the forum State may give more difficulty under the
doing-business statutes,01 but should be no problem under statutes providing
jurisdiction over isolated torts committed in the State. 92 So long as an agent
of the defendant has physically entered the State to promote the sale of the
offending goods, there is no serious constitutional problem; as Hanson v.
Denckla demanded, the defendant has conducted activities in the State, although the cause of action did not arise solely from acts of the agent in the
State but required in addition other acts committed elsewhere.

85 Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Il. 1961); McMahon
v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. IUI. 1961).
86
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 33-41(c) (3) (1960); NEV. REv. STAT. 5 14.080 (1961);
N.C. GrN.
STAT. S 55-145(a) (3) (1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 262.05(4) (Supp. 1963).
1
7 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
88
Aldridge v. Marco Chem. Co., 356 S.W.2d 615 (Ark. 1962) (and delivery in defendant's trucks).
8 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654, 662-63 (D. Md. 1950).
90 Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 459-60, 106 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1959).
91Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cit. 1953)
(Mississippi law). But see S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
92 In Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959), jurisdiction was
denied although there had been "some" solicitation of orders within the State. It was
not clear whether the goods in issue had been sold through such solicitation.
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There is a deep split of authority, however, on the question of jurisdiction in product-liability cases in the absence of solicitation, sale, or delivery by the defendant's agents within the State of injury. In such cases,
jurisdiction has usually been denied under the old doing-business statutes. 93
In considering jurisdiction under single-act or product-liability statutes,
several factual variants should again be distinguished. The strongest case
for jurisdiction is one in which the defendant itself shipped the product
into the forum State, and the plaintiff was an outsider to the transaction.
The equities seem clearly to favor permitting the plaintiff to sue in his own
State; he has done nothing to connect himself with the seller's State, while
the seller has voluntarily introduced something into the buyer's State,
knowing that a risk of injury was created. But some courts have refused
jurisdiction even here under broad jurisdictional statutes. In Mann v.
Equitable Gas Co., 94 a Texas company had sold pipe to the plaintiff's employer for use in West Virginia. The court refused jurisdiction over an
action brought against the seller for personal injuries when the pipe exploded in West Virginia, holding as in Hellriegel that the West Virginia
single-tort statute required "that the alleged tortfeasor, or his agents . . .
[be] in West Virginia at the time of his act, which is alleged to have resulted in the tort." The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that State's
explicit product-liability statute unconstitutional in a comparable defamation
case.905 The Connecticut, Nevada, and Wisconsin statutes, which also expressly permit suit though the defendant never sent agents into the State, 96
have not been tested. But Illinois is not alone in upholding jurisdiction in
such cases. Oklahoma has gone perhaps even further, 7 and the Minnesota
Supreme Court, rejecting an earlier federal decision, 98 has held its single-tort
provision to apply, and to be constitutional as applied, to cases of injury
to third parties resulting from direct shipments to the forum State, without
the aid of agents there. 99
E.g., Ex parte Emerson, 270 Ala. 697, 121 So. 2d 914 (1960).
94 209 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. W.Va. 1962). The court did not say whether the
sale had been solicited in the State, or where delivery had been made.
95
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
9
6See note 86 supra. The New York legislature, by excepting defamation cases
from its single-tort statute because of the likelihood that offending material would enter
the State despite its remote origin, implied that other New York injuries resulting from
acts outside the State were intended to be included. See notes accompanying N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAw & RULES 1302 (1963).
9 S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954). See text accompanying note 136 infra.
98 Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., supra note 92. This decision went even further than
most, for it held it irrelevant that there had been solicitation by defendant's agents in
Minnesota.
9Adamek v. Michigan Door Co. 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961); Atkins v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
9
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No Supreme Court authority is directly in point. Tort jurisdiction has
been upheld in single-act cases such as Hess v. Pawloski,'°° but only when
the defendant or his agent has entered the State in person. The nearest
favorable decision was McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., where the Supreme Court, with an inconclusive but generally approving citation of an
Oklahoma product-liability case,' 0 ' upheld California's jurisdiction over an
action by the beneficiary of a California insured against an out-of-State insurance company whose only contact with the State had been the mailing
of the policy in suit into the State and the receipt elsewhere of premiums
mailed in California by the California insured: "It is sufficient for purposes
of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State." 102 But here Hanson v. Denckla poses a serious
obstacle. The Court there stressed that McGee concerned "an activity that
the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation" and announced the requirement that the defendant "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." 103 It is certainly a permissible reading of Hanson that the defendant or its agent
10 4
must be physically present in order to "conduct activities" in the State;
of Appeals has declared that Hanson limited
and the Seventh Circuit Court
05
McGee to insurance cases.1
Hanson v. Denckla, however, is not a statute and should not be read
as such. The holding of the case was that the Delaware trustee of a trust
established by a Pennsylvania settlor was not subject to the jurisdiction of a
Florida court. The trustee's only connections with Florida had been by
correspondence after the settlor moved there subsequent to the establishment of the trust. I am inclined to agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice
Douglas that jurisdiction could have been sustained by considering the
trustee in privity with the settlor, since under the terms of the trust it
was "purely and simply a stakeholder or an agent holding assets of the
settlor to dispose of as she designated." 106 However, on the Court's view

101274 US. 352,
101 355 U.S. 220,
102 Id. at 223, 78
103 357 U.S. 235,

o4

47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
223 n.2, 78 Sup. Ct. 199, 201 n.2 (1957).
Sup. Ct. at 201.
252, 253, 78 Sup. Ct. 1228, 1239, 1240 (1958).

The Supreme Court of Washington has so read Hanson. Tyee Constr. Co. v.

, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963) (dictum).
Wash. 2d Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 05
1
Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959).
10o 357 U.S. at 263, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1245. Professor Leflar says this description overlooks the fact that the trustee had already paid out the disputed funds, Leflar, Conflict
of Laws, 1958 Survey of American Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 20, 32 n.75 (1959). But since
apparently there was no suggestion of a breach of trust, it seems the trustee had no

interest in the outcome. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REv. 249, 257-58 (1959).
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that the trustee should be treated as independent, it was easy to find that
it had insufficient contacts with Florida. Not only had it never been
there; it had not, as had the defendant in McGee, voluntarily entered into
a business relationship with a resident of the forum State. Once the settlor,
who retained substantial control over the trust res, moved to Florida, the
trustee had no choice but to deal with her there or to resign. It is arguable that its refusal to resign was a voluntary acceptance of a business
connection with Florida; but, in view of the alternative, the case is certainly not on all fours with McGee even apart from the insurance aspect.
The suggestion that McGee should be limited to matters (such as
insurance, securities, and highways) in which the State has some "special"
regulatory interest 107 is no more persuasive when the defendant acts outside the State than when he acts inside.' 08 I cannot see why a State is any
less strongly concerned to ensure that its injured residents recover compensation from those who injure them than from those who promise to
pay for injuries caused by others. The decisions determining the liability
of a tort defendant for acts in one State according to the law of another
State in which injury occurred are legion.' 09 When the State's interest
justifies choice of its substantive law, the question of jurisdiction is half
solved. The essence of the second requirement, imposed by Hanson, is
that the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an
effect in the forum State. This was satisfied in McGee by the voluntary
acceptance of an obligation to insure a California resident; it is met in the
product-liability cases by shipping a product into the State for use or
consumption there. When a manufacturer-or any other seller-knowingly sends something into a state for his own economic gain, it does not
seem unjust to expect him to answer there for the consequences. It would
be odd if in a federal system Illinois could not enter a judgment against a
man who stands in Indiana firing his gun at people in Illinois; the man
who ships in unwholesome food is in no different situation. Nor does his
position differ materially from that of the defendant, as in Nelson v. Miller,
whose servant is sent into the State and causes injury there. In either case,
having set into motion a force which he intends to send into the State,
he may fairly be required to defend an action there." 0 One of the best
arguments I have seen for upholding jurisdiction in this kind of case was

107 357 U.S. at 252-53, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1239-40; see Mueler v. Steelcase, Inc., supra
note 92, at 418; note 105 supra.
108See notes 48-57 supra and accompanying text.
109 E.g., Dalas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 SE. 766 (1936); Hunter v. Derby
Foods, Inc, 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D.&C. 40 (1937).
1o See Reese & Galston, supra note 106, at 260-63. Contra, Comment, 42 MARQ. L.

REv. 537, 548 (1959).
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made by a federal judge in Minnesota in holding against jurisdiction. The
defendant, a Michigan firm, had sold a defective chair to a Minnesota retailer, who had sold it to the plaintiff. The court declared that Minnesota
law would be applicable; that most of the witnesses were in Minnesota;
that trial in Minnesota would be less burdensome to the defendant than
trial in Michigan would be to the plaintiff; and yet, said the court with
apparently no tongue in cheek, to hold trial in Minnesota would be so unfair
as to deprive the defendant of property without due process of law! 'll
In Gray itself, the defendant's connection with Illinois was somewhat
more tenuous. The defendant manufacturer had not itself shipped the
defective valve into Illinois, but had sold it to another company outside
the State, and it had later been shipped into Illinois. The difficulties presented in such a case can be illustrated by a familiar choice-of-law decision.
In Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,"12 plaintiff sought to impose liability
under an Ontario law upon a New York automobile owner whose employee had driven the car negligently in Ontario, causing injury. Judge
Learned Hand, despite his attachment to the rules of the Restatement of
Conflicts,"8 did not simply uphold application of the law of Ontario as
the locus of the tort. The case was remanded for a determination whether
the defendant had authorized his agent to drive into Ontario; only if he
had, could the law of that Province be applied. This is not to read the
technicalities of frolic and detour into the choice of law; it is to recognize
the injustice of imposing unforeseeable liabilities."14 This principle has
been recently restated by the Supreme Court of California in a suit
brought to forfeit the interest of a Texas mortgagee in an automobile used
to transport narcotics in California. A California statute providing for
forfeiture unless the mortgagee made a character investigation was held
inapplicable because, despite the California policy of soliciting the aid
of moneylenders in curtailing the narcotics traffic, it would be unfair
to subject the Texas company to a liability it had no reason to anticipate." 5
A similar philosophy should limit the applicability of section 17 to suits
involving injuries within the State due to conduct elsewhere. The Oregon
automobile owner who lends his car to a friend to drive around the block
can hardly anticipate that the car will make its way to Illinois; the owner
can scarcely be said to have "purposefully availed [him]self of the privi-

111Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., supra note 92, at 418.
112 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
n3 See Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson SSs., Ltd., 43 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1930).
4
1 Since New York law was the same as Ontario's, Professor Cavers is quite right
that the result was absurd, Comment, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L.
REV. 822, 828 (1950). Liability for the bailee's acts was certainly no unfair surprise on
the facts.
"' People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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lege of conducting activities" in Illinois, and it would seem as improper,
and as unconstitutional, for Illinois to assert personal jurisdiction as for
Illinois law to be applied against the absent owner.
Product-liability cases too can perhaps be imagined in which the entry
of products into the State would be such a surprise that the assertion of
jurisdiction would be unfair. A European manufacturer who sells all his
products at retail in Europe might be in such a position if one of his
customers later moved to Illinois and was injured there because of negligent manufacture. But it cannot be said that a manufacturer places himself
in this innocent position whenever the distribution of his product is handled
by independent middlemen. The Texas brewer of bunion potions whose
"independent" distributors resell his wares to Alabama druggists may not
have "agents" in Alabama to subject him to jurisdiction under the doingbusiness statute,1 16 but he cannot plead he is not knowingly responsible
for the introduction of the product there. The explicit product-liability
statutes make provision for protecting the hypothetical innocent manufacturer from unforeseeable liability. Nevada asserts jurisdiction over
any foreign concern which "manufactures, produces, makes, markets or
otherwise supplies directly or indirectly any product for distribution, sale
or use in this state;" Wisconsin requires that "products, materials or
things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used
or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade;" Connecticut and North Carolina require that the defendant produced or distributed the goods "with the reasonable expectation that those goods are
to be used or consumed in this State." 117 The unsuspecting manufacturer
whose product strays into Nevada or Wisconsin may be held not to have
supplied it for distribution or use in Nevada and his product not to have
been used in the ordinary course of trade in Wisconsin. The best and
most explicit of these provisions, that of North Carolina, has been held
unconstitutional by that State's supreme court in a case quite like Gray.118
But the North Carolina court did not base this decision on the fact that
the sale by the defendant had been to an independent middleman outside
the State, for it had earlier denied jurisdiction even when the defendant
shipped its product directly into North Carolina. 119
116 Ex parte Emerson, supra note 93; cf. Dooly v. Payne, 326 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1964).
7

1- NEv. REv. STAT. S

STAT.

14.080 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT.

S 55-145(3)

(1960); Wis.

ANN. S 262.05(4)(b) (Supp. 1963).

118 Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).

The

Iowa court has declared its doubts that such a case would present a tort committed
in the State, Hill v. Electronics Corp. of America, 253 Ia. 581, 113 N.W.2d 313 (1962)
(dictum).
'"9 Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., supra note 95. See note 95 supra and
accompanying text.
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In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court held it immaterial that the defendant had not itself introduced the defective valve into Illinois, because
the valve had been "presumably sold in contemplation of use here." 120 I do
not think the court, in its use of the word "presumably," was sliding carelessly over the failure of the plaintiff to prove the critical fact that use here
should have been contemplated. Rather the court seems to have meant
that a company which manufactures in this country parts which are to
become components of water heaters later to be marketed in the United
States should be presumed, as a matter of law, to have contemplated their
eventual sale and use in Illinois, and that consequently a suit here cannot
be said to come as an unfair surprise. I quite agree with the court.
The two decisions of the Seventh Circuit denying jurisdiction in cases
of tort injury in Illinois from activities outside the State-Trippe 121 and
Insull122---did not involve liability for injury due to defective goods.
Trippe was a suit for unfair competition in catalogs mailed into Illinois;
Insull for libel in newspapers mailed here. Reliance on the rule of the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, as suggested by the supreme court in
Gray, would prescribe an overruling of both these decisions. The injury
to plaintiff's business in the former occurred in Illinois, where his business
was located; the injury to plaintiff's reputation in the latter occurred, according to the Restatement, wherever he had a reputation and the statements were read 123 -including Illinois. There seems little doubt that
Trippe is doomed, based as it was on the principle, rejected in Gray, that
the defendant or his agent must be physically present within the State.
But Illinois, as pointed out in Insull, follows the rule that the tort of libel
is committed (for purposes of the statute of limitations) not whenever
and wherever the material is read, but when and where it is first published. 124 Thus, if the Illinois courts adhere strictly to the principle that
a "tortious act" is committed in this State only when the last act necessary
to establish liability occurs here, Insull may very well still be the law.
This would be unfortunate. The supreme court's discussion in Gray
of the place of the last necessary event should be read simply as demonstrating that injuries resulting from acts in other States can be embraced
within the permissible meaning of the statutory phrase "tortious act
within this State." Legislative intention, the court said, "should be de-

120Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d 432, 442,

176 NE.2d 761, 766 (1961).
121

Trippe Mfg.Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., supra note 105.

'-2Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273
123 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 377, example

F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
7 (1934).

124Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 IM. App. 59, 78 N-E.2d 708 (1st Dist. 1948);
Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 187 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1951).
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termined less from technicalities of definition than from considerations
of general purpose and effect." A rigid rule requiring the last event necessary for liability to occur in Illinois, no less than the rule rejected in Gray,
"would tend to promote litigation over extraneous issues concerning the
elements of a tort . .. , whereas the test should be concerned more with
those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature." 125 The aim of the statute, as the court
stated, was to establish jurisdiction wherever constitutionally possible;
if it is possible in some cases where the last necessary event does not occur
in Illinois, the purpose of the statute should not be frustrated by tying its
interpretation to an irrelevant standard. 126 For the words no more require
that the last necessary event occur here than that the defendant be present;
the commission of a "tortious act" in Illinois ought to be construed, in the
light of the statutory purpose and the requirements of due process, to
embrace all tort actions in the outcome of which this State can assert a
constitutional interest and in which it would not be unfair to subject the
defendant to Illinois jurisdiction. This, I submit, is the essence of the
opinion in Gray.
Judged by this standard, Insull must go. An Illinois resident claimed
to have been harmed by articles mailed into Illinois by defendants. The
Illinois libel laws are clearly designed to protect Illinois residents against
defamation; Illinois has an interest in applying those laws in such a case.
It is no more unfair to subject a newspaper publisher than a valve maker
to suit here when both have deliberately caused their wares to be consumed in Illinois. It is no answer that only a relatively few copies of the
papers in Insull were sent into this State; one copy is enough to damage
a reputation and to constitute a tort. Consideration of libel cases tends
to become befogged by thoughts of press freedom and by the common
feeling that the recent $500,000 verdict rendered in Alabama against the
New York Times for an advertisement relating to racial unrest 127 was the
result of an unfair or biased trial. But a defendant who has received an
unfair trial is entitled to a reversal on grounds of due process, and perhaps

12522 IM. 2d at 436, 176 NE.2d at 763. For a sample of the possible extraneous
issues, compare Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra note 124, with O'Reilly v. Curtis Pubfishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940), and compare both of these with Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) (Phillips, J., dissenting).

1- See Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50
Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 609-10 (1955). Montana may have done so in altering the Illinois
form to authorize suit arising from "the commission of any act which results in
accrual within this state of a tort action." MONT. REv. CODES ANNt. S 93-2702-2
B() (b) (Supp. 1961).
127New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), reversed
on non-jurisdictionalgrounds, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
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1948 was too soon to repeal a statute allowing a defendant to remove a
case to a federal court when it appears that "from prejudice or local
influence, he will not be able to obtain justice" in a state court.128 Assuming,
as the Supreme Court has held, that there are libel laws which do not infringe the freedom of the press, l 29 it is difficult to understand why a State in
which libels are circulated should lack power to enforce those laws for the
protection of its residents. 3 0 A quite different problem would be presented
by the publication of matter defaming an Illinois resident, or invading
his privacy, but with no distribution, or with only accidental and unforeseen distribution, in Illinois. This State's interest in protecting the
plaintiff would still exist, and there is authority in the field of invasion of
privacy that the tort occurs where the plaintiff resides.' 3 ' But I doubt that
the assertion of power in such a case could pass the test of a voluntary
conduct of activities in the forum State, or that in general it would be
32
fair to the defendant.
With regard to the propriety of a test based on the place of the last
necessary event, consider also this example. An Illinois housewife buys in
Chicago a can of tuna fish packed by a California defendant and shipped
to Illinois for sale. She takes the fish to the Indiana Dunes for a picnic,
consumes it there, and is stricken there with botulism due to the defendant's negligence. The Restatement test in such cases points to the
State in which the offending material took harmful effect, in this case

128Act of March 2, 1867, c. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 559, repealed by 62 Star. 869 (1948),
because, as the revisers said without extraordinary prescience, "these provisions, born
of the bitter sectional feelings engendered by the Civil War and the Reconstruction
period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by three wars
against foreign powers." Revisers' Note to 28 U.S.C. S 1441 (1958). See HART &

WEmsLER, Tm FEDERAL CoUrTs AND Tim FEDERAL SYSTEM 896-97 (1953).
129 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952). Non-malicious

defamation of public officials has been extended constitutional protection. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
"0 Mississippi has recently provided, and I think validly, for civil and criminal
jurisdiction over "persons who are responsible for the importation" of obscene matter
into the State from outside. Miss. CODE ANt. S 2674.16 (Supp. 1962). Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., supra note 95, where jurisdiction in a case similar to Insull
was denied, was not limited to libel cases; the court there cited Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), with apparent approval.
But see Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1960 Survey of American Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 36,
42 (1961), suggesting that freedom of the press may make jurisdiction harder to
sustain in defamation cases. Both Maine and New York except defamation from
their single-tort statutes, Maine requiring physical injury, ME. REv. STAT. AiN. c.
112, S 21 (Supp. 1961). New York made the exception because of the likelihood that
offending matter would enter the State despite its remote origin. See notes accompanying N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RuLES § 302 (1963).
121 Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., supra note 125.
113See Cleary & Seder, supra note 126, at 609-10.
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Indiana. But why should the Illinois court decline jurisdiction? Illinois
policy requires the compensation of its resident, injured through the sale
of contaminated food in Illinois, no less because she became ill 30 miles
beyond the State line. It would not be seriously suggested that application of Illinois law would be unconstitutional. 133 And in no sense can the
fact that the fish was eaten in Indiana make it more or less inconvenient
or unfair to the defendant to be sued in Illinois, a State into which he
knowingly sent his wares for purposes of profit. 3 4 Conversely, Indianathe place of the wrong according to the Restatement-would not be a
singularly appropriate forum in the same situation. Its only interest in the
outcome would appear to be the accumulation of a fund for payment of
possible medical creditors, and there is good authority for a restrained
construction of tort laws to avoid frustrating a possibly greater interest
in such a case.' 8 5 On the other side of the scale, the defendant may control the distribution of his product, and may never have shipped goods
into Indiana; we have once again a case in which his only connection
with the suggested forum is the rather remote possibility that a can sold
in another State may find its way there-not too far a cry, perhaps, from the
case of the car owner whose bailee unexpectedly drives too far.
In interstate product-liability cases either the plaintiff or the defendant must litigate in a foreign court. In the cases I have so far discussed,
the balance of convenience-more properly, perhaps, the balance of
equities-clearly has favored permitting the plaintiff to sue in his home
State: Either the plaintiff has been an innocent stay-at-home injured because the defendant shipped his product into the State, or he has been a
stay-at-home buying goods from a seller who sent his agent into the
buyer's State to negotiate the sale or to make delivery. When the plaintiff is a purchaser, and when the sale is negotiated entirely by correspondence or telephone with both buyer and seller remaining in their own
States, the equities seem more evenly balanced; perhaps it is relevant to

133 Cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 1962), where

even the dissenters conceded the power of New York to apply its wrongful-death
statute in the case of a New Yorker who had boarded a plane in New York and
died in a crash in Massachusetts.
134A court in Minnesota has upheld jurisdiction in a quite comparable case.
Lockheed sold an airplane to Northwest Airlines for use in flights to and from
Northwest's Minnesota home. On a flight from Minneapolis, a man was killed when
the plane crashed in Indiana. The case was made somewhat stronger by the presence
of a Lockheed service representative in Minneapolis, while in two respects the case
was weaker than the hypothetical one I have posed: The plaintiff was a nonresident,
and the suit was based on foreign law. Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962).

135 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US. 354, 381-84, 79 Sup.
Ct. 468, 485-86 (1959). See B. Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the
Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 1, 65-75 (1959).
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ask who initiated or solicited the transaction. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, however, has upheld jurisdiction-and under an archaic doingbusiness statute at that--over an action for damages when defective goods
were shipped into the State pursuant to an order placed by the purchaser
with an independent broker in Oklahoma and forwarded to the defendant. 3 6 When the seller has remained at home, and the buyer has gone
to his place of business to negotiate the sale or to accept delivery, the
equities are again altered: It is difficult to suppress the feeling that the
buyer can be fairly expected to return to the State where he did business
if he wishes to bring suit.
This analysis would support the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in the leading case of Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc.13 7 Suit was brought to recover damages for the shipment of defective
goods into North Carolina pursuant to an order placed after a visit by the
buyer's agent to the seller's place of business in New York, and the court
held the North Carolina product-liability statute unconstitutional as applied. Judge Sobeloff did not base his decision on the buyer's New York
adventure; his opinion was broad enough to preclude jurisdiction in any
case of an isolated shipment into the State, at least so long as the seller
accepted the offer at home and had not sent agents into the forum State.
In Erlanger Mills the buyer's contact with the seller's State seems sufficient
to require the buyer to return there as defendant if sued for the price; 138
it is arguable that it so affects the equities as to require the buyer to return
also when he is plaintiff.
More extreme cases can easily be imagined. Judge Sobeloff based his
opinion in Erlanger Mills partly on his apprehension that a contrary decision would support jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over a California retailer
who has sold defective tires in California to a Pennsylvania tourist, who
suffers injury in Pennsylvania.13 9 This is an interesting and difficult case.
The State of injury certainly has an interest in the application of its law
to permit recovery. The defendant acted with knowledge-from one look
at the license plates-that his tires would be taken to that State and create
a risk of injury. He therefore cannot claim surprise or deny that he had
voluntary contact with the State of injury; and yet the assertion of juris-

I'"S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., supra note 97.
137 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
'3 8 See Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 206 (1957). Cf. Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 I. App. 2d
475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962). See notes 188-93, 208-09 infra and accompanying
text. The fact that title to the goods passed to the buyer on delivery to a carrier in
New York is wholly immaterial, whether buyer or seller is plaintiff.
139 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). Cf. Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., supra note 92,
at 419.
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diction is likely to seem unfair. An even more extreme case has recently
arisen in North Carolina. A South Carolina garageman was allegedly
negligent in repairing a South Carolina automobile in South Carolina, and
the plaintiffs were injured in North Carolina as a result. A federal court
14°
held the assertion of jurisdiction in the State of injury unconstitutional.
Because the defendant dealt with a resident of his own State, jurisdiction
seems still more doubtful than in Judge Sobeloff's case, although because
of the mobility of automobile owners the garageman could reasonably
have anticipated that injury might occur outside of South Carolina. A
similar problem would be presented by a New Jersey suit arising out of
an over-the-counter sale by Macy's in New York to a customer who did
not reveal that he lived in New Jersey.
Judge Sobeloff was right on one point: It is not easy to rationalize
a distinction between these cases and Erlanger Mills. The distinction is
not between manufacturers and retailers; I would have no trouble upholding jurisdiction over Macy's for defective goods shipped into the forum
State. Perhaps one factor is that the tire dealer or repairman "is set up
to do business locally whereas the other depends upon foreign consumption." 141 But does the fact that Macy's also does a large mail-order business distinguish between suits against Macy's and against merchants with
only local business, if both suits arise out of over-the-counter sales? The
fact which seems of most significance is that in the tire, auto-repair, and
over-the-counter cases, the customer was in the defendant's State both
to make the purchase and to accept performance, while in cases such as
ErlangerMills the product was shipped into the forum State, by the defendant or by some distributor, before it reached the plaintiff. Again, the equities
are shifted more heavily in favor of the defendant; perhaps, still more
strongly, it is not inequitable to require the plaintiff to return to the seller's
place of business to present his claim.
But this is to state the wrong conclusion. The question is not
whether the seller's State is a more appropriate forum than the buyer's;
the question is whether suit in the buyer's State is so unfair to the defendant as to amount to a denial of due process. It is not a complete
answer to say that the seller's State would be a fair forum for the plaintiff, because perhaps both are fair. Due process does not always single
out the most appropriate State as the only one in which suit can be
maintained. Moreover, while the relative equities as between the parties
are of importance in determining the question of jurisdiction, they are
not the sole consideration. State interests are also important. Whether
the seller came to North Carolina or the buyer went to New York, the
1

4oEasterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. I (M.D.N.C. 1960).
Developments 929.

141
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seller voluntarily, and for purposes of profit, sold goods which he well
knew might create a risk of harm in North Carolina. Defective California
tires, Professor Cardozo has pointed out, are as dangerous in North
Carolina as California drivers; 142 the interest of North Carolina in applying its laws to protect people within that State from such risks, or to
compensate them for damages suffered, is indisputable. This is no less
true if the buyer traveled to the seller's State to pick up the goods, to
negotiate the purchase, or to do both. I am therefore convinced that the
application of North Carolina law to any of these cases would be constitutional, so long at least as the defendant knew with whom he was
dealing. Does it not follow that North Carolina is entitled to provide a
forum in which to assure the enforcement of its laws? It is strange that a
defendant can claim a constitutional right to be free from the application of a law that can be constitutionally applied. In this day of modem
transportation and communication, as the Illinois court stressed in Gray, 48
the inconvenience and expense of trial in a distant State, while by no
means neglible, may not be so overwhelming as to make it fundamentally
unfair to subject a businessman to suit as a cost of doing business with a
known resident of the forum State.
I have overstated the case somewhat. Hanson v. Denckla makes it
clear that there may be occasions when a State cannot supply a forum to
ensure the enforcement of admittedly constitutional laws,'" and this is
probably correct. I am not convinced that it would be unconstitutional
to apply Illinois law to an action for assault brought by an Illinois resident attacked by an Ohioan in Ohio, if the defendant knew where the
plaintiff lived, but I would be disturbed at the prospect of an action
brought in Illinois. Arguably, if a seller has sufficiently confined his activities to his own State-I make no effort to define "sufficiently"-he
should be entitled to have his own court decide whether to apply the
buyer's State law rather than the seller's, which is equally constitutional.
Otherwise there may be no way in which the seller's State can enforce
its laws for the protection of its businessmen, and arguably, as emphasized
in Erlanger Mills, interstate business may be discouraged. 145
There is one relevant fact in the case of the South Carolina garageman which I have not yet mentioned: The suit was brought not by the
South Carolina owner but by two North Carolina residents, one a bailee
and the other a guest. 46 This puts a different cast on the equities of the
142 Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of Jurisdiction, 43
CoRaEa. L.Q. 210, 214-15 (1957).
143 22 Ill. 2d at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (1961).
'L44357 U.S. at 253, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1240.
145239 F.2d 502, 507 (1956).

'"Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., supra note 140.
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situation, as I have already discussed. More pointed than the case of these
plaintiffs, who at least had gone to South Carolina to borrow the car, would
be the case of an injured North Carolina pedestrian. As between the innocent plaintiff, who may have had nothing to do with the business arrangement in South Carolina, and the garageman, who knew that if he were negligent someone in North Carolina might get hurt, who should have to travel
to litigate? As far as the plaintiff who is not a party to the business transaction is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a product is taken into the State by
the defendant himself or by someone else. Such a plaintiff could sue in
Illinois under the Gray case if defective tires had been brought into the
State by an independent contractor or distributor; he should also be able
to sue in Illinois if the tires are brought in by an individual who bought them
from a California retailer. I think this is true even in Easterling,where the
services were rendered to a resident of the garageman's State. And if this
is so, what is the reason for denying jurisdiction when the injured plaintiff
is the man who bought the tires in California? Not that the interest of the
State of injury is insufficient; the interest is the same. Not that the defendant's acts are insufficient to justify bringing him to the State of injury in all
cases, for he could be brought there by a third party. But only that the
plaintiff's activities in the seller's State are sufficient to subject him to suit
there. And this, I submit, does not make it unfair to entertain suit in the
State of injury as well. I agree with Professor Cardozo that jurisdiction in
that State would be no violation of due process even in Judge Sobeloff's
extreme example of the California retailer and the Pennsylvania tourist. On
the other hand, had the suit in Easterling been brought by the owner of the
justification for allowing suit outrepaired car, I would find no compelling
14 7
domicile.
common
of
State
the
side
I should add that I by no means feel that my conclusion with respect to
the tire problem is necessary in order for me to disagree with the decision
in Erlanger Mills. The hypothetical tire case clearly comes within the
meaning of the North Carolina statute, for it arises from the "distribution
of goods . . . with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be

used or consumed in this State." It would also, under the test of the last
event necessary for liability, constitute a "tortious act" committed in the
State where the injury occurred, if fault on the part of the seller were alleged. But we need not throw the baby out with the bath. In Erlanger
Mills, the defendant shipped the defective product into the forum State;
it would not have been inappropriate to uphold the eminently fair assertion
of power there even if one were convinced the tire case would be unfair.
Since the test is fairness in the particular case, it is scarcely necessary to decline jurisdiction in one case because jurisdiction would be unfair in another.

247Cardozo,

supra note 142, at 214-15.
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While the distinction may be hard to express, it should suffice that jurisdiction in the one case offends the sense of justice, and in the other it does not.
Similarly, the proper decision in such cases is not determinative of the correct result in Gray; the upholding of jurisdiction in Gray itself was a bold
and commendable decision fully in the spirit of this bold statute and fully
consistent with the due-process requirement of fundamental fairness.
"THE

TRANSACTION OF

ANY BUSINESS WITHIN THIS

STATE"

"Doing business" in the State was the constitutional test for service of
process on foreign corporations before International Shoe; a corporation
"doing business" in the State was held to have impliedly consented to suits
against it and to be constructively present in the State. 148 The new section
17 speaks in language altogether too reminiscent of this outmoded theory:
It provides for jurisdiction over any person in suits arising from "the transaction of any business within this State." 149 Fortunately, the courts in con-

struing this section have not been led astray by this linguistic resemblance;
in general, Judge Campbell's view has prevailed that pre-section 17 decisions concerning what constitutes "doing business" do not govern interpretation of the new statute. 150 In one important type of case, however, the
state courts as well as the federal have been unduly restrictive in their construction of the transaction-of-business provision.

Applicability to Individuals
Section 17 provides for service on "any person" transacting business in
this State, in person or by an agent. This is an innovation. In 1915 the
5 1 refused full faith and credit
Illinois Supreme Court, in Flexner v. Farson,1
to a Kentucky judgment rendered after service on the agent of a nonresident partner doing business in that State. A State's power to subject foreign
corporations doing business there to suit, the court reasoned, was based upon
its power to exclude them from doing business; as it had no such power
with respect to individuals, it could not impose implied consent to suit as a
condition of their doing business. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
on the same ground. 152 When the Court upheld service upon absent nonresident motorists in Hess v. Pawloski,153 it noted the State's power to
exclude individuals from use of its highways. And when, in Henry L.

Doherty Co. v. Goodman,154 the Court upheld service on the agent of a
148 See cases and authorities cited note 13 supra.
149 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, 5 17(1) (a) (1963).
I"0 Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. IMl.1957).
151268 IH. 435, 109 N.E. 327 (1915).
152 248 U.S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919).
1- 274 U.S. 352, 356, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 633 (1927).
'54 294 U.S. 623, 627, 628, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 554 (1935).
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nonresident individual doing business in the forum State, its evident disapproval of Flexner was modified by reference to the fact that the sale of
securities, in which the defendant was engaged, was also a subject of "special
regulation" in which "neither her citizens nor non-residents could freely
engage." Indeed, no decision of the United States Supreme Court has yet
upheld state-court jurisdiction by service of process on an absent nonresident individual doing business within the State, absent a "special" regulatory interest.
Rather plainly, however, the new Illinois statute provides for such
jurisdiction by the pointed reference to "any person," a phrase which, while
155
it obviously includes corporations, still more obviously includes people.
In Sunday vu. Donovan,15 6 the Illinois appellate court applied the statute to
an individual defendant who had become a nonresident after the cause of
action arose, without adverting to the existence of an issue. Not much more
attention was deserved. The State's power over a foreign corporation doing
business here is not based on its power to exclude it; the State has jurisdiction over corporations engaged in nothing but interstate commerce within
the State, although it has no power to exclude them. 5 7 InternationalShoe1 6 6
made abundantly clear that the test of personal jurisdiction is fundamental
fairness to the defendant in the light of state interests and trial convenience
as indicated by the existence of contacts with the State. There is no earthly
reason for limiting this test to corporations. If it is fair to subject corporations with certain business contacts with the State to suit there, it is no
less so to do the same with individuals similarly situated. 5 9
Continuous Business Activities by Agents in the State
Cases such as Sunday v. Donovan 160 and People ex rel. Hoagland v.
Streeper,''1 in which the defendant was engaged in running a cigar jobbing
business or a toll bridge in Illinois, would have presented no difficulty before
section 17 was passed. 162 But prior to InternationalShoe not every foreign
corporation with agents engaged in continuous activity in the State was
amenable to suit there. The most conspicuous exception was that expressed

155 Cf. United States v. Wise, 370 US. 405, 82A Sup. C. 1354 (1962).
156 16 III. App. 2d 116, 147 N-E.2d 401 (1st Dist. 1958).
157 International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 US. 579, 34 Sup. Ct.
944 (1914). See Developments at 935-36.
158International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 319-20, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 15960 (1945).
111See Sobeloff, supra note 138, at 207.

16 16 I1l. App. 2d 116, 147 NE.2d 401 (1st Dist. 1958).
12 Ill. 2d 204, 145 NE.2d 625 (1957).
62
" See Italian-Swiss Agricultural Colony v. Pease, 194 Ill. 98, 62 N.E. 317 (1901).
1-
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1
by the United States Supreme Court in Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., '
and followed by the Illinois courts as a rule of due process: 184 "mere solicitation" of orders to be accepted and filled from outside the State did not
constitute the requisite "doing business." Rather minimal additional activities were found sufficient in later cases, 165 and InternationalShoe itself,
in which the doing-business test was repudiated as a constitutional requirement, can hardly be said to have involved anything more than continuous
solicitation of orders and shipment into the State. 166 There was also some
authority that purchases within the State, even when made in person by the
defendant's agents and "at regular intervals," could not alone constitute "doing business." 167
Cases of repeated solicitation or purchases seem to be among those to
which International Shoe was particularly directed.' 68 "[Slo far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state,
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." 169 In
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 70 the only
Virginia activities of a Nebraska insurance company held subject to suit in
Virginia for failure to comply with the Virginia blue sky law respecting insurance of Virginia risks were that its policyholders within the State had
recommended new members and that it had "caused claims for losses to be
investigated" there. This case is practically on all fours with Pembleton v.
Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n,' 7' in which the Illinois Supreme Court
had refused to enforce a Nebraska judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The
only limitation I find of weight in Hanson v. Denckla is that the defendant
"purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum State," 172 a qualification that is fully satisfied whenever there
are agents working for the corporation within the State, whether or not
they have power to contract and whether or not they make sales as well
as purchases.

205 U.S. 530, 533-34, 27 Sup. Ct. 595, 596 (1907).

'4G. W. Bull & Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 344 IM. II, 175 N.E. 837 (1931);
Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 IMI.99, 124 N.E. 355 (1919).
16 E.g., International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, supra note 157.
16 326 U.S. 310, 3 13-15, 66 Sup. Ct. at 157.
167 Rosenberg

Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 US. 516, 518, 43 Sup. Ct. 170,

171 (1923).
8
16 See Cleary & Seder, supra note 126, at 608 (solicitation).
169 326 US. at 319, 66 Sup. Ct. at 160.
170 339 US. 643, 648, 70 Sup. Ct. 927, 930 (1950).
'7- 289 IIl. 99, 124 N.E. 355 (1919). Suit in Pembleton was by a beneficiary, not by
the State; and no entry had been made to adjust claims.
172 357 U.S. at 253, 78 Sup. Ct. at 1240.
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A number of courts, since InternationalShoe, have construed statutes
in the old language of "doing business" to extend beyond the old limits,1 7 3
and there is no indication that the Illinois courts will do otherwise with the
somewhat different language of section 17. One federal district court has
upheld service on a corporation for a suit arising out of the operation of an
office in Chicago for the solicitation of orders, rejecting arguments based
on old cases and suggesting no factors to place the case within the old rule
of "solicitation plus. '174 And the Illinois appellate court has upheld jurisdiction of a suit based solely on a contract to purchase goods made in
connection with a visit by the buyer's agent to Illinois. 175 These sensible
decisions will doubtless be followed; the new statute has freed Illinois from
the technicalities of the "doing business" rule with respect to suits arising
from transactions within this State.
Isolated Business Transactions in the State
1 76
it
Although I have found no Illinois authority squarely so holding,
was quite frequently asserted that isolated transactions by a foreign corporation did not constitute "doing business" within the State. 177 Even in International Shoe the Court declared that "the commission of some single or
occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an
obligation or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer
upon the state authority to enforce it" and emphasized that the company's
Washington activities "were neither irregular nor casual. They were

17s E.g., Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958); Enco, Inc. v. F. C. Russell Co., 210 Ore. 324, 333-37, 311 P.2d 737, 741-43 (1957).
See Developments at 1001. In Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So. 2d
559, 561 (1950) (dictum), the court declared continuous solicitation sufficient.
174 Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co, supra note 150.
17 5
Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 111. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
1-7In Darling & Co. v. E. Rauh & Sons' Fertilizer Co, 242 I1. App. 375 (1st Dist.
1926), the court denied jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which had "occasionally"
solicited purchases or sales of goods to be sent into or out of the State. This is not solid
authority for a rule requiring more than "isolated acts" in the State, for solicitation
would not have constituted "business" even if continuous. See notes and text 162-67 supra.
In Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins & Reynolds Co., 244 Ill. 354, 91 N.E. 480
(1910), it was held that a foreign corporation did not "transact any business" in Illinois
by making an isolated sale of five carloads of cement to an Illinois buyer. The question
there, however, was not whether the foreign corporation could be sued, but whether
it had forfeited the right to sue in'Illinois by transacting business in the State without
qualifying to do so. Some courts, quite properly, required less activity to subject a
corporation to suit than to require it to qualify, even before International Shoe. E.g.,
Colorado Iron-Works v. Sierra Grande Mining Co., 15 Colo. 499, 25 Pac. 325 (1890).
177

See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1018, 1028-29

(1925); Developments at 922; Comment, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 674 (1955); Annot., 78
A.L.R2d 397, 401 (1961).
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systematic and continuous .... , 178 In Travelers Health the Court pointed
out that "the Association did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived
transactions." 17 In upholding a product-liability suit based on the tort
provision of section 17, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the Gray case, covered
itself by the assertion that "defendant does not claim that the present use
[I]t is a reasonable inof its product in Illinois is an isolated instance ....
ference that its commercial transactions, like those of other manufacturers,
result in substantial use and consumption in this State." 180 Moreover, in the
four States which have added to their doing-business statutes provisions for
jurisdiction over persons who "perform any character of work or service
in this State," 181 no court seems to have suggested that these words
broadened the jurisdictional standard,1 8 2 and there have been decisions under
the Mississippi statute holding an isolated business transaction insufficient,
without mention of the new language. 183 But McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co. did concern an isolated transaction; and the Court held it sufficient
that "the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection
with that State." 184 Moreover, there is authority that an isolated sale in the
forum State can constitute "doing business" under an unamended statute,184
and several States have enacted statutes explicitly providing for jurisdiction,
often only in suits against corporations, arising out of contracts made1 86

1T8 326 U.S. at 318, 320, 66 Sup. Ct. at 159, 160. For the former proposition the
Court cited Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., supra note 167, which seemed
to rely as much on the fact that the activities were purchases as that they were infrequent; for the Court said that "visits on such business" would not suffice "even if
occurring at regular intervals." 260 US. at 518, 43 Sup. Ct. at 171. The Court in Inter-

national Shoe cited this rule as a matter of history and did not imply its approval.
x*1339 U.S. at 648, 70 Sup. Ct. at 930.
180

Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 M. 2d 432, 441-42, 176
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
'-ALA. CoDE, tit. 7, 5 199(1) (1958 & Supp. 1961); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 27-340
(1962); MD. AiNN. Coox) art. 75, S 78 (1957); Miss. CoDE ANN. S 1437 (1957). Louisiana

recently amended its statute to provide for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that
"has engaged in a business activity in this state," LA. REv. STAT. ANN. S 13:3471 (Supp.
1962). An accompanying note says this was intended to take advantage of International
Shoe.
182 Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), is no ex-

ception, despite the hint to the contrary in Developments at 1002.
18 Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1953);
Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran, 206 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Miss. 1962).
184 355 U.S. 220, 233, 78 Sup. Ct. 199, 201 (1957). Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927), involved a single tort.
18 E.g., S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co, 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954). It was even
probable that the defendant had no agent in the State at all.
18
CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 33-41(c)(1) (1960); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23 S 92(d)
(1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-145(a) (1) (1960).
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or to be performed 187 within the State. A Maryland statute to this effect
was upheld in Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 18 a case concerning a single transaction.
The Illinois statute is not explicit on this, and the "transaction of any
business" could have been held by an unsympathetic court to be a
synonym for the earlier restrictive term "doing business." Again in the
spirit of the statute's purpose to expand jurisdiction to the modern constitutional limit, however, the courts have consistently upheld jurisdiction
under section 17 over an isolated business transaction with the requisite

connection to this State. In Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co.,18 9 an action
for breach of warranty was sustained upon service made on a foreign corporation in Colorado. The defendant had sent its agent into the State to
solicit the order for vending machines which had then been shipped to
plaintiff here. The company had also agreed to "obtain the 'initial locating
contracts' " and to send a mechanic to Illinois to train plaintiff's employees
in maintenance of the machines. The appellate court held that these contacts were more than the minimum required by due process and did not consider whether or not the defendant had engaged in other activities beyond
the single transaction in suit. Decisions by the appellate court in Kropp
Forge Co. v. Jawitz 190 and by the Seventh Circuit in National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux 191 are to the same effect.
These decisions are plainly correct. A single transaction resulting in
injury or loss to a person within the reach of the policy of an Illinois law
is sufficient to give the State an interest in providing a forum for his compensation, whether the suit be called "tort" or "contract." When a foreign
corporation contracts to sell goods to an Illinois businessman, as in Berlemann and National Gas Appliance, or to purchase machines from him as in
Kropp Forge, the Illinois policy of holding people to their bargains is called
into play. It does not seem unfair to the defendant, in the light of this interest to require him to defend in Illinois a suit arising out of such a contract,
when he has sent his agents into the State to solicit or to conclude the agreement. That the defendant has also conducted other and unrelated activities in
the State may or may not make it more convenient for him to defend here,

187CowN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 33-41(c) (1) (1960); IOWA CoDE ANN. S 617.3 (Supp.
1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-145(a) (1)
(1960); TEx. CIv. STAT. art. 2031(b) (4) (Vernon Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
S 855 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. 5 3083 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 262.05(5) (Supp.
1963).
188 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
L8917 Il1.App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (4th Dist. 1958).
190 37 Il. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
191

270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
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but the basic requirement that he make voluntary contact with the State is
satisfied without such additional contacts. The nonresident motorist and
the insurer of a risk within the State may be compelled to defend suits
arising from isolated transactions; 192 1 have elsewhere expressed my convicto matters in which the State has an
tion that these cases cannot be limited193
allegedly "special" regulatory interest.
Business "Within This State"-Physical Presence of Agents
In Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 9 4 two Chicago businessmen sued defendant, a New York corporation, for breach of their contract as exclusive
distributors of defendant's products in Greater Chicago. The contract had
been concluded by mail between New York and Chicago, after negotiations
with defendant's president in Chicago. The appellate court, ignoring this
contact, held that the defendant was not transacting business in Illinois
simply because the plaintiffs were selling its wares here, since plaintiffs were
not agents but independent distributors. 19 5 Over the dissent of Justices
Davis and Schaefer, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, largely on the
same ground: Plaintiffs "were not transacting business for the defendant in
Illinois; they were transacting business for themselves." 196 International
Shoe was distinguished because in that case "defendant's salesmen were
employed in the State of Washington."' 97 No reference was made to the
possible significance of the negotiations held in Illinois, and the court seems
not to have considered whether the making of the contract between plaintiff
and defendant constituted the transaction of business. Later, in Saletko v.
Willys Motors, Inc.,198 the appellate court denied jurisdiction over an action
for breach of a contract of sale, negotiated and concluded by correspondence and telephone between the plaintiff in Illinois and the defendant in
Ohio. The meaning of Grobark, said the court in Saletko, was that "the
performance of jurisdictional acts, by defendant or its agents while physically present in Illinois, is essential" under the transaction-of-business clause
of section 17.
Grobark itself, it is clear, went somewhat beyond that, for although it

192 Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 184; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 78 Sup. Ct. 199 (1957).
'9

See notes 48-57, 102-11 supra and accompanying text.

1- 16 Ill.
2d 426, 158 NE.2d 73 (1959).
19518 11. App. 2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958). The court also held that

the alleged contract was void for want of consideration. The supreme court found it
unnecessary to decide this. It is irrelevant to whether business was transacted in
Illinois.
Ill.
2d at 437, 158 N.E.2d at 79.
197 Ibid.
19836 M1.App. 2d 7, 12, 183 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1st Dist. 1962).
196 16
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did not discuss the point, the court's opinion reveals that there had been
negotiations in Illinois. It is quite unfortunate that the court did not discuss
the nature of these negotiations or why it deemed them insufficient for jurisdiction. The obscurity of the opinion makes it difficult to assess the impact
of the decision on other situations involving less than continuous activities
within the State. Certainly the court did not intend to repudiate the
principle that jurisdiction may be based upon a single act, for its cast no
recognizable aspersions on that aspect of its own earlier decision in Nelson
v. Miller; 199 indeed, the court acknowledged the Nelson holding that the
legislature intended to exhaust its constitutional power.2°0 But must the entire transaction be consummated in the State? What is the effect of Grobark on Berlemann,20 ' where an order was solicited in Illinois, a servant
was sent here to train maintenance men, and the defendant promised, apparently, to install the machines he sold? On Kropp Forge,20 2 where an
agent came to Illinois to inspect turbines and generators and either concluded the sale here or acted "in furtherance of it"? This decision came
after Grobark, and the court was not persuaded that the cases were similar.
In National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 203 the Seventh Circuit,
which has not been noted for any conspicuous tendency toward an expansive reading of the statute, upheld jurisdiction in a contract action based
upon "negotiations, conferences, contacts and meetings between the agents
of plaintiff and defendant. A substantial part thereof occurred in the State
of Illinois." An agent had come to Illinois to discuss engineering details and
also, the court was convinced, to persuade the plaintiff to contract. The
court cited Grobark with no apparent apprehension that it cast doubt on
this result.
Were the Illinois activities of the defendants in these cases more substantial than those in Grobark? In Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods.,
lnw.,204 the Supreme Court of Washington held that jurisdiction may be
unfair even when the defendant's agent has entered the State, if his presence there was "incidental, rather than essential, to the transaction." The
defendant in Tyee was a broker hired to sell generators owned by a Washington company; it had sent agents into the State to inspect the generators
and to observe dismantling and loading operations after the sale. Suit was
by the loading contractor, whose agreement was with the seller, to recover

I- 11 1U. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). See text accompanying notes 36-65 supra.
200 16 M11.
2d at 431, 158 NE.2d at 76.
201 Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co., 17 IMI.App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (4th Dist.
1958).

20

2Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, supra note 175.
2- 270 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1959).
2" -- Wash.2d, 381 P.2d 245, 252 (1963).
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for additional labor costs; the seller filed a cross-claim seeking to hold the
broker responsible. Without necessarily approving the result in Tyee, I
agree that the casual presence of an agent in the State should not be the
determinative factor. Cases can be imagined in which negotiations in the
State prove fruitless and a contract results much later as a result of correspondence alone; in such a case the negotiations in the State are perhaps
too remote or preliminary to be relevant. But this does not appear to have
been the case in Grobark, for the plaintiff alleged that "all negotiations leading up to the contract" occurred in Chicago, 205 and apparently this was not
denied. The defendant argued that the transaction must "be completed
entirely within this state by an agent or employee of the defendant physically
located within the state," 208 and perhaps this is what the court held.
But I do not think so; I think the courts were quite right in Kropp
Forge and in National Gas Appliance in brushing Grobark aside although it
could not be said that the entire transaction took place in Illinois. The court
in Grobark never addressed itself to the relevant question. The plaintiff did
20 7
point out that the defendant's agent had come to Chicago to negotiate,
but he did not stress it; his principal argument seems to have been that the
defendant was transacting business in Illinois because the plaintiff was
marketing its product here. 20 The court contented itself with refuting this
proposition. It is difficult to believe that the court would have reached the
same result had the controversy been focused on the proper question. The
making of the contract itself was the transaction of business, whether or not
the subsequent activities of the buyer could be imputed to the seller. When
a defendant has sent an agent into the State to solicit or negotiate a contract
concerning the purchase or sale of goods to an Illinois resident, it is difficult
to deny that it has transacted business here or that it has "avail [ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." In sum, I do
not believe Grobark casts serious doubt on jurisdiction in cases in which an
agent of the defendant has entered the State for purposes significantly and
proximately related to an agreement, purchase, or sale; but after Grobark
it cannot be safely said that jurisdiction will be held proper whenever an
agent of the defendant has entered the forum State in relation to the matter
in suit.
But Grobark probably means at least what the appellate court says it
means: There can be no "transaction of business" in Illinois unless the defendant or his agent performs some act while physically within the State. 20 9
20

5Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co, 16 IU.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959), Record, p. 30.
06 Id., Supplemental Answering Brief, p. 14.
207 Id., Petition for Leave to Appeal, pp. 25, 27; Brief, p. 3.
208
Id., Petition for Leave to Appeal, pp. 25-27, 30; Brief, pp. 10, 13-14, 17.
2

2o Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 M. App. 2d 7, 12, 183 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1st
Dist. 1962); Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, supra note 175, at 480-81, 186 N.E.2d at 79.
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The Supreme Court of Washington, relying on Hanson vu. Denckla, has
made this a rigid requirement,2 10 and it is the same test once proposed by the
federal courts in Illinois for product-liability and other tort cases. 2 1 ' But the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., discussed above, 212 cut the ground from under Grobark.
There, it will be recalled, jurisdiction was upheld in a product-liability case
over a foreign manufacturer which had sold its goods outside Illinois, "presumably" in contemplation of resale and use in this State. Gray was in two
respects a weaker case for jurisdiction than was Grobark: No agent of the
defendant had entered the State, and the product had been shipped into the
State by someone else. Yet jurisdiction was upheld, for reasons which I have
described as sufficient; Grobark was not dignified by so much as a citation.
In Gray, it is true, jurisdiction was claimed because of the "commission
of a tortious act" in Illinois rather than because of the "transaction of any
business." But Grobark was not based on the language of the statute; it
held the assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional. 213 Moreover,
the language of the two provisions does not require different results; if a
tort can be committed in Illinois although the defendant is not here, business
can be transacted here the same way. Ample justification of a more expansive reading of the business provision can be found again in the Restatemernt of the Conflict of Laws, relied on by the court in Gray. Just as a
tort has often been deemed committed where the injury occurs, so a contract has often been deemed made where the offer is accepted; this could be
whenever an offer is mailed into the State and an acceptance mailed back,
214
although the defendant has never left Ohio.
Nor is there any basis in constitutional policy for a distinction in this
regard between tort and contract actions. This is most clearly illustrated by

210

Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., -Wash.
251 (1963) (dictum).

2d

-,

381 P2d 245,

21 1
Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc, 270 F.2d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1959);
Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. MI.1957); Insull v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (ND. Ill. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 166
(7th Cir. 1959). Accord, Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654, 661
(D. Md. 1950), and cases discussed in notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
-2122 M. 2d 432, 176 NE.2d 761 (1961). See notes 81-121 supra and accompanying

text.

16 Ill. 2d at 438, 158 N.E.2d at 79.

213
214 RESTATEMENT, CNFLIcT OF LAWS

S 326 (1934). I find no negative implication
as to jurisdiction over other kinds of business transacted by correspondence from the
explicit statutory provision for.jurisdiction in insurance cases concerning all risks within
the State. The statute was enacted after McGee; insurance was one field in which it
was certain that physical entry into the State by an agent of the defendant was not
required. With respect to other business, the question was (and is) an open one, and
a statute intending to open the full breadth of state power ought not be read to have
closed the door to a judicial determination of unresolved situations.
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cases such as Morgan v. Heckle,2 15 in which a federal district court denied
jurisdiction in a suit for damages when a delivery of seed did not comply
with a contract negotiated by telephone between the plaintiff in Illinois and
the defendant in Tennessee. Had it been alleged that the seed had been
negligently manufactured, Gray would permit jurisdiction for a tort committed by shipping the seed into Illinois and causing a loss here. 216 Can it
be seriously contended that the interest of Illinois is less, or the burden on
the defendant greater, because the allegation was a breach of warranty? If it
is not unfair to call in a defendant in tort when he has shipped something
defective into the State, it is no more so on the same facts because the suit
is based on a breach of promise.
Morgan, therefore, is doomed by Gray. Grobark and Saletko, moreover, are not substantially different in terms of policy. Both were suits
against foreign corporations for the refusal (among other things, in Grobark) of the defendant to deliver goods which the defendant had promised
to sell the plaintiff for distribution in Illinois. The defendants in those cases
did not send goods into the State as in Gray and Morgan-indeed, that was
the reason for complaint. But it would be passing strange to hold that a
defendant is better off if he refuses altogether to perform his obligation
than if he performs it unsatisfactorily-that he can immunize himself from
service of process by breaking his contract. Illinois has a policy of securing
to her businessmen the benefit of their bargains, as well as one of compensating them for injuries; the former is no less vital to the health of the Illinois
economy than the latter. The significant contact rendering it fair to the
defendant that he be sued here is not the shipping of goods into the State so
much as the promise to do so; by making this promise, he has purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of doing business with Illinois people who are
in Illinois.2

17

The Wisconsin statute expressly allows jurisdiction in cases

arising from shipments into the State by the defendant and from promises
by the defendant to ship goods in, regardless of where the promise was

171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
21 Gray was a stronger case in that the plaintiff was a stranger to the transaction,
while the plaintiff in Morgan had negotiated by mail with the out-of-State seller. But
this should not change the result. See taxt accompanying notes 134-47 supra.
217 In Saletko, supra note 209, the Illinois buyer was to pick up the goods in Ohio.
The defendant did not promise to ship them into Illinois, and the case is therefore one
step removed from Grobark. On the other hand, it is one step short of a case such
as Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.RD. 1 (MD.N.C. 1960), where the buyer
was at the defendant's place of business not only to receive the services but to negotiate
and complete the contract; for in Saletko the contract was concluded by mail and telephone while the plaintiff was in Illinois. Whatever the correct disposition in Easterling,
I think either contracting long distance or delivery into the plaintiff's state should suffice; who hired the trucker is not important. See text and notes 134-47 supra, and
224-52 infra.
215
6
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made; 21 8 and a Minnesota federal court has refused to dismiss a suit very
similar to Grobark, saying the contacts with the forum State seemed suf219
ficient.
Gray also sheds considerable doubt, if there was no doubt before, on
the correctness of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Orton v. Woods Oil &
Gas Co. 22o There the court disallowed service under section 17 in an
action brought by an Illinois lawyer and an Illinois business engineer for
fees earned in performing work in Illinois for the defendant corporation
respecting its incorporation and the registration of its securities. The
corporation had no other contacts with Illinois. The decision was partly
based on the fact that the original arrangement for the work done was
necessarily entered into by defendant's predecessor, since the corporation
was not yet in existence, and that the work done was a prerequisite to,
rather than a transaction of, the defendant's business. The first suggestion
is quite lacking in merit, and the second savors of the mildewed subtleties
sought to be abolished by the new statute.221 If the corporation is liable at
all on its promoters' contracts, it must be because of a subsequent ratification
or adoption of the bargain; this surely constitutes a voluntary association
of itself with the State of Illinois and makes the corporation equally subject
to suit here as the original employer. By the phrase "transaction of business"
the legislature meant to exhaust its constitutional power; surely it cannot
be relevant to the interest of the State or to the justice of summoning the
defendant whether a contract which it makes for the performance of
services here concerns dealings prior or subsequent to incorporation. If it
is suggested that "business" does not include the relations between an employer and its employees, that is rejected by two better decisions under
section 17 ,22 and it cannot withstand analysis in terms of policy. This leaves
only the fact that the contracts of employment were apparently negotiated

218WIS. STAT.

ANN. S§ 262.05(5) (c), and (e)

(Supp. 1963).

2

9 McMenomy v. Wonder Bldg. Corp, 188 F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1960). Some
negotiations had taken place in Minnesota; the contract seems to have been concluded elsewhere; and defendant had sent an agent to Minnesota to adjust a claim.
The Minnesota court has also upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident who sold stock
to a Minnesota plaintiff by telephone and mail without ever entering the State.
Paulos v. Best Securities, Inc, 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961). Since securities were involved, those seeking to limit the value of this case as precedent
could point out that, as in McGee, which Paulos closely resembles, a "special"
regulatory interest was affected.
220 249
221

F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957).

Cf. Automotive Material Co. v. American Standard Metal
IMI.367, 158 N.E. 698 (1927). Since this decision concerned the
license to do business, it was probably right, but too likely the
been held with respect to jurisdiction over the foreign company.
2
2 Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co. 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. I.
Donovan, 16 Ill. App. 2d 116, 147 N.E2d 401 (Ist Dist. 1958).
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without the presence of any agent of defendant in Illinois, the fact deemed
immaterial by Gray. Even without Gray, it would seem odd that a defendant could be sued in Illinois by third parties who had dealt with these employees 2 3 but not by the employees themselves for their own compensatior 22 4 And after Gray, it seems plain that the presence of an agent in the
State should not be required when the defendant has contracted with a
Wisconsin has made
resident of this State for work to be performed22 here.
5
express provision for jurisdiction in such cases.
I have referred to the "rule" for determining the place of contracting
in order to illustrate the flexibility of the language of section 17. I think it
altogether praiseworthy, however, that no court construing this provision
has suggested that business is transacted in Illinois for purposes of jurisdiction whenever, or only when, a contract or sale is completed in Illinois according to this rule. The Maryland legislature, for example, in generalizing
from the nonresident-motorist situation to the assertion of jurisdiction over
"every cause of action arising out of a contract made within this State or
liability incurred for acts done within this State" was on the right track,
but it chose a connecting factor which has involved it, as the Illinois court
warned against in Gray, in "litigation over extraneous issues," with unfortunate results. Park Beverage Co. v. Goebel Brewzing Co.,226 for example, was an easy case in which to sustain jurisdiction. Not only had the
defendant shipped bad beer to the plaintiff in Maryland, but the defendant's
agent had gone to Maryland to solicit the contract. Yet, although this
would have satisfied even the Seventh Circuit,227 jurisdiction was denied by
a court not unsympathetic to expanded personal jurisdiction 22 8 because the

'-'Even without the long-arm statute. Cf. Italian-Swiss Agricultural Colony v.
Pease, 194 Ill.
98, 62 N.E. 317 (1901).
224This distinction was drawn with apparent approval in Rosenberg v. Andrew
Weir Ins. Co, 154 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D. Md. 1957), a case similar to Orton and reaching
the same result.
25Wis. STAT. ANN. S 262.05 (5) (Supp. 1963): "In any action which:
"(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some
third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within
this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or
"(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant
by the plaintiff within this state if such performance within this state was
authorized
or ratified by the defendant; ....
22
79 A2d 157 (Md. 1951).
2"National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1959).

22 8

See Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 108
A.2d 372 (1954) (dissenting opinion), upholding jurisdiction over a Panama company
which had concluded a contract for the purchase of ships from a Maryland plaintiff
Defendant's agents had come to Baltimore for negotiations and to inspect the ships; the
court held the contract made when the plaintiff signed in Maryland.
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contract was made when the plaintiff's offer was accepted in Michigan. 22 '
Conversely, due process is not always assured by the fact that the contract was "made" within the State. Kaye-Martin v. Brooks,280 decided by the
Seventh Circuit, was an action for damages for nonperformance of an
agreement to sell stock. The plaintiffs were residents of New York, the
defendant of Arkansas. Negotiations had begun in New York; the parties
met in Chicago during a convention and concluded a tentative agreement;
the final contract was signed in Texas, and service was made there. The
Seventh Circuit quite correctly held there was no jurisdiction under the
transaction-of-business provision: It was "fortuitous" that "some of the
events leading up to the execution of the final contracts in Dallas" occurred
in Illinois. The court did not bother deciding whether the contract was
made when tentative agreement was reached in Illinois or only when the
final papers were signed in Texas, and for this it should be commended.
Assuming the contract to have been made in Illinois, the case falls within
the language of the Connecticut, Maryland, and North Carolina statutes.
Yet, even on this assumption, Illinois had no legitimate interest in the outcome of the case. Neither party was an Illinois resident or engaged in
normal business activities in Illinois; performance was not to take place
here; the property involved was not in Illinois. It would have been simply
meddlesome-and unconstitutional 2 3 -for Illinois law to be applied to
frustrate the interests of the States whose policies were affected. In the
absence of any such interest, it is difficult to justify requiring the defendants to return to Illinois and defend,2 32 as they would have had to do if the
plaintiff had done regular business in Illinois. In some cases of this sort,
Illinois might be a convenient forum for witnesses, but this would be no less
true if the offer had been made here and accepted in Texas. In any case,
the technical location of the last act necessary to create a binding obligation
is in no sense relevant to the interest of Illinois or to the justice of bringing
in the defendant.
The plaintiff's residence (or his place of business), a factor often found

229

For other examples of the irrelevant technicalities of the Maryland statute,

see Ericksson v. Cartan Travel Bureau, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 315, 317 (D. Md. 1953);

Panamerican Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S. A., 219 Md. 478, 150 A.2d 250
(1959).
230 267 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1959). In Baughmar Mfg. Co. v. Hein, 44 Ill. App. 2d

373, 194 N.E.2d 664 (3d Dist. 1963), the court also refused jurisdiction although the
contract in suit had been signed in Illinois. But if, as seems likely, the plaintiff manufacturer was operating in Illinois, the decision seems doubtful. Kropp Forge Go. v.
Jawitz, 37 111. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962).
231 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 US. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338 (1930).
232

See Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. REv. 249, 259-60 (1959).
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in single-contract statutes,

23 3

is more important than the place of contract-

ing, for in a great many cases the State of plaintiff's residence will have an
interest in protecting him from injury and in securing him the benefit of his
bargain. But residence of the plaintiff is not always necessary in tort 234 and
may not be in contract; for example, it might not be inappropriate to subject to suit in Illinois a nonresident who has contracted to build a summer
home for another nonresident in Illinois. Nor by any means would I grant a
State jurisdiction over every defendant who enters into a transaction with
one of its residents, and none of the statutes does so. It seems clear that it
would be unfair to subject an Ohio driver to suit in Illinois because the man
he ran down in Cleveland lived in Chicago. Such a suit would not seem
appreciably more fair if the accident occurred during a Shriners' convention
which the defendant knew had brought numerous nonresidents into Ohio,
or even if the defendant knew before the accident that the plaintiff lived in
Illinois. In contract cases as well as in tort, the defendant's knowledge that
he is dealing with an Illinois resident does not seem sufficient in all cases.
It certainly would seem unfair to subject a defaulting purchaser of the
Encyclopedia Britannicato suit in Illinois if the purchase had been consummated by a salesman who visited the buyer in his home in New York, even
if the purchaser had known the Britannica had its principal offices in Chicago. Here, even more clearly than in Judge Sobeloff's case of the California tire dealer and the Pennsylvania tourist,235 there is something to the
notion that a party who has gone into a foreign State to do business with
one of its residents can be expected to go back to bring suit.
But unfairness is not always lacking when plaintiff and defendant, each
in his own State, negotiate by correspondence. In the very interesting case
of Conn v. Whitmore,236 a Illinois horse fancier wrote to the defendant in
Utah, offering to sell him several horses. The defendant had a friend inspect
the horses in Illinois, accepted the offer by mail from Utah, and sent a
servant to Illinois to pick up his purchases. Said the Utah Supreme Court in
refusing to enforce an Illinois judgment against the buyer for the price:
"[I]t was not the defendant Utah resident who took the initiative by going
into Illinois to transact business, nor did he engage in any activity resulting
in injury or damage there. Quite the contrary, it was the plaintiff resident
of Illinois who proselyted for business in Utah .

. . ."

In Fourth North-

2" CoNN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 33-41(c) (1960); IowA CoDE ANN. S 617-3
(Supp. 1962); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, S 92(d) (1957); MwNo. STAT. ANN. S 303.13 (Supp.
1962); N.C. GENt. STAT. S 55-145 (1960); T.x. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2031b(4) (Supp.
1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 1 855 (1958).

2 4 See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
23
5Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc,

239 F2d 502, 507 (4th

1956). See notes 135-47 supra and accompanying text.
2369 Utah 2d 250, 255, 342 P2d 871 (1959).
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western Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Industries, Inc.,2 3 7 the plaintiff, a Minnesota
company, had shipped goods to defendant in Ohio after correspondence
initiated by mailed inquiries from the defendant's predecessor and a visit by
the seller's agent to the buyer's offices in Kentucky. Suit was brought by
the seller to recover on promissory notes later executed by the defendant
during a meeting in Ohio with agents of the seller; the Minnesota court refused to sustain jurisdiction. These are hard cases. To simplify the picture,
consider the situation in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 2 3 8 A Texas
company was held subject to jurisdiction in California in an action arising
out of a policy issued after correspondence to a California resident. I have
no hesitation in applauding this result, but I would find it unfair to subject
the policyholder to suit in the company's home State, 239 although that State
has an interest in safeguarding its companies that cannot be said to be less
than California's in protecting its risks, and although the insured's mailing
of documents and premiums was as much a knowing association with that
state as was the company's mailing matter to him.
The reasons for this difference are quite elusive; I have great sympathy
for the efforts of the Utah and Minnesota courts to translate a subjective
sense of unfairness into concrete distinguishing factors. The matter of the
initiative was mentioned in both Conn and Hilson; the Minnesota court
distinguished its product-liability decisions upholding jurisdiction because
in those cases the nonresident defendant had been the "aggressor." 240 This
alone is not entirely satisfactory. In Hilson the negotiations had been begun
by a feeler mailed to the plaintiff by the defendant; and in any event I
would not be convinced that McGee could be sued in Texas if it were
shown that the insured rather than the company had initiated the transaction. The Minnesota court also stressed that the plaintiff in Hilson was no
defenseless individual but a corporation. 241 But I do not think this can be
carried very far. The corporation which buys a defective machine should
be able to sue just as if it were an individual; and I would feel no differently
in the McGee situation if the insurer had been a partnership or an individual.
A more promising distinction is the fact that the company entered into this
transaction for profit and the insured did not; defending in California can
be said to be a cost of doing business for profit. Indeed something of the
sort may be implicit in the concept of transacting "business," and the Idaho

-7

264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).

-8 355 U.S. 220, 78 Sup. Cr. 199 (1957).

239 Cf. Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts,

50 Nw. UL. REv. 599, 608 (1955).
240

Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Industries, Inc., 264 Minn. 110,
115, 117 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1962).
41
2 1d. at 117, 117 N.W.2d at 736.
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statute seems to incorporate this distinction expressly. 242 But this implies
a possibly different result if the insurance covered premises used for business,
and I am not certain that I would allow jurisdiction even there. This
distinction too would require dismissals in product cases in which I think
suit could be upheld. Finally, Hilson suggested that a distinction should be
drawn between nonresident sellers and nonresident buyers.2 43 At first glance
this appears to make little sense, but it has precedent in the reluctance of
courts before InternationalShoe to hold that purchases within the State constituted "doing business." 244 In addition, the Minnesota court argued, the
nonresident buyer does not enjoy the benefits and protections of local law
to the same extent as the foreign seller. This is rather tenuous. There may
be some merit to the distinction in that the seller by sending something
into the State creates a risk of injury here, but I would not follow this so
far as to deny jurisdiction over sellers for nonperformance. 245 The distinction has utility in that it serves to separate the mail-order house from its
customers and the insurance company from its policyholders. But it is difficult to explain in policy terms, and again it should not be carried so far
as to result in a denial of jurisdiction in cases such as Kropp Forge Co. v.
JaWitz, 46 in which the buyer's agent came into the state to pursuade the
resident seller to sell.
Conn is not far from Kropp Forge, since the buyer in Conn sent agents
to Illinois to inspect and to pick up the horse. These contacts are perhaps too
incidental, to adopt the test of the Washington court in Tyee,247 to overbalance the fact of the seller's initiative. In the case of a nonresident seller
I would not deny jurisdiction because the buyer, after correspondence, received delivery in the seller's State.2 48 But the Wisconsin statute would have
upheld jurisdiction in Conn because the buyer promised the plaintiff to "receive within this state . . . goods . . . or other things of value." 249 Conn
could easily have gone either way. Hilson may be a harder case for jurisdiction; although the buyer was a business corporation and had taken the

"The transaction of any business within this state" in a statute copied from

242

Illinois is defined as "the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary

benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation." IDAHO CODE ANN. S 5-514(a) (Supp. 1963).
243 264 Minn. at 117, 117 N.W.2d at 736.
244
See text accompanying notes 166-67 supra.
245
See notes 216-19 supra and accompanying text.
24837 IMl.App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962). See text accompanying
notes 189-93, and 208-09 supra.
247
See text accompanying notes 204-05 supra.
248 But see Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., supra note 209. See note 217 supra.
24 9

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(5) (c) (Supp. 1963).
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initiative by mail, its agents had never gone to the seller's State. The decision was probably right, although the facts were still not so extreme as
the case of the everyday mail-order consumer, posed by the court in Conn.
No magic formula leaps to mind to solve all these cases. In each case
all the factors must be considered-among them whether the defendant is
buyer or seller; whether he or the plaintiff is in business; who took the
initiative; whether the defendant sent agents into the plaintiff's State, and
if so under what circumstances. The relative abilities of the plaintiff and the
defendant to htigate in a foreign forum may also be relevant; as the court
said in Conn, to permit the mail-order house to bring suit on small claims
in its home state may effectively deny the customer the right to defend3'5
Finally, care should perhaps be taken at the outer limits of fairness not to
uphold jurisdiction where the court feels that to do so might discourage
people from engaging in interstate transactions. 251 I do not think the difficulty of formulating objective justifications for felt distinctions signifies
either that the fairness test is a poor one or that an artificial but simple line
should be drawn short of the limits imposed by relevant policies. The essence of due process is that proceedings shall be fair; whether they are fair
must be a subjective judgment based on the common sense of the judge.
Such judgments must be made in other areas of constitutional law, such as
in determining whether a search or seizure was "unreasonable." 252
I have placed some emphasis on the place of performance of a contract as perhaps of more significance than the place of contracting. In a
product-liability case, for example, it seems important that the defendant
has shipped goods into the State. But cases can arise in which the place
of performance is fully as fortuitous and as irrelevant as the place of
making; the statutes providing for jurisdiction of contracts to be performed
in: the State, 25 3 therefore, both leave gaps where jurisdiction should be
asserted and assert it where it is unreasonable. Suppose, for example, that
two New Yorkers agree that a loan shall be repaid when they meet in
Miami on their next vacation. In the Hilson case, presenting a similar
problem, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to sustain jurisdiction over
a case which it deemed otherwise inappropriate merely because the notes

Utah 2d at 255, 342 P2d at 875.
sslConn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (1959); Fourth
Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson, 264 Minn. 110, 117, 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1962).
See Wham, An Expanding Concept: Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 44 A.B.A.J.
250 9

422, 424 (1958).

2.5 Compare the conclusion of Professor Harper with respect to the distinction
between servant and independent contractor for vicarious-liability purposes, Harper,
The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 hu.
L.J. 494, 499 (1935).
53

See note 187 supra.
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in suit provided for payment in Minnesota.25 4 The admirable Texas statute
providing for jurisdiction over any nonresident individual or corporation
"entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State," 255 on its
face would permit Sears Roebuck to sue its customer in the State where
it delivered goods to a carrier for shipment, or the insurance company to
sue McGee in its home State; but it would exclude an action on a debt
contracted in Texas between Texans if one party were strong enough to
insert a provision for payment and return just across a nearby State line,
and it would not allow the nonresident to sue in Texas for default in the
construction of his summer house there, unless he could allege the commission of a tort.
The more flexible language of the Illinois statute, allowing suit concerning "the transaction of any business within this State," is preferable,
although it is too susceptible of construction as in Grobark requiring
physical entry into the State. Where the relevant factors are so many and
so elusive, ideally a statute should be phrased in terms of general policy
considerations, leaving the courts a good degree of latitude in determining
its applicability to new cases. 256 Of course, it is not necessary, or necessarily
desirable, for a State to exercise its full constitutional power; I would
not advocate taking jurisdiction on the basis of unrestricted nationwide
service even if the Supreme Court should declare that due process imposed
no limitations. If there are specific cases or classes of cases in which the
assertion of jurisdiction would be constitutional but appears undesirable,
the legislature should make this clear. In the absence of such cases, I would
approve a statute providing for jurisdiction whenever the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the forum State has a sufficient interest in the
controversy to authorize the application of its substantive law;257 (2) the
254

264 Minn. at 118, 117 N.W.2d at 736.

REv. Civ. STAT. art. 203lb(4) (Supp. 1960). A federal district court
held this unconstitutional when no Texas contacts were pleaded other than the
making of a contract with a Texas resident for the exclusive distribution of Citroen
cars in Texas, Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48
(S.D. Tex. 1960). On these facts the case resembles Grobark and the decision is
wrong, see notes 209-19 supra and accompanying text. The court of appeals reversed
because an amended complaint offered after the opinion was announced had alleged
additional activities of the defendant in Texas, including negotiations there during
which an understanding was reached; shipment of a number of cars into Texas;
maintenance of a warehouse there; and several promotional and service visits by defendant's agents. 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
26 Reese & Gaston, supra note 232, at 266-67, emphasize the difficulty of specifying all cases on which jurisdiction is proper without overstepping the bounds of
due process in other cases. They advocate statutes drafted in broad terms, perhaps
with non-exclusive lists of illustrative cases.
2 Whether the forum State in fact has an interest in applying its own law
2STEx.

depends not only on contacts such as the residence of the parties and the place where
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defendant acted with knowledge of such facts that he could reasonably
anticipate that his acts would have consequences within this State; and
(3) the assertion of jurisdiction does not offend the concept of fair play
and substantial justice in all the relevant circumstances.
"THE OWNERSHIP, USE, OR POSSESSION OF ANY REAL ESTATE
SITUATED IN THIS STATE"

The first statute of this type was that of Pennsylvania, adopted in 1937,
which subjected the "owner, tenant, or user, of real estate" in Pennsylvania to suit "arising out of or by reason of any accident or injury occurring
within the Commonwealth in which such real estate, footways, and curbs
are involved." 258 This was upheld by a trial court in a suit for damages
suffered in a fall on a broken sidewalk: "It is just as important that nonresident owners of Philadelphia real estate should keep their property in
such shape as not to injure our citizens as it is that nonresident owners of
cars should drive about our streets with equal care." 259 The Pennsylvania
statute is limited to "accident or injury" cases; it seems no more than a
specialized provision for the commission of certain torts in the State. Since
a landowner may commit a tort without ever entering the State, simply by
permitting his sidewalks to fall into disrepair, even the Pennsylvania law
requires something beyond Hess v. Pawloski to sustain it. But a person who
knowingly acquires title to land has certainly no ground for complaint when
asked to defend a tort suit there arising from his ownership; and I have already expressed my lack of concern in such cases for whether the defendant
260
is within the State.
The Illinois property statute is not so limited; it applies to suits of any
nature arising from real estate in Illinois. This may well include actions on
contracts to buy or to sell land in the State, 261 on contracts to build or
repair houses on Illinois land, 262 or on brokerage contracts respecting the
the acts were done, but most emphatically also on the content and policy of its laws.
The State should not apply its law simply because the plaintiff is a resident, if

the case is not within the law's purpose. But I would not require a determination
that the forum's law in fact applies before upholding jurisdiction, any more than I
would require under the Illinois statute that a tort was actually committed. Nelson
v. Miller, 11 111.2d 378, 393-94, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957). See text and notes 36-38
supra. It should suffice that the complaint alleges Illinois contacts adequate to support
an argument that Illinois law applies.
28
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 331 (1953).
9
2' Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D.&C. 61, 64 (1938).
2o0
Text and accompanying notes 100-11 supra.
2' See Cleary, Venue, Process and Jurisdiction, 44 Iu. BJ. 364, 368 (1956).
2 2 Oklahoma provides for jurisdiction over owners of any interest in oil and
gas leaseholds on land within the State in suits for "labor performed or materials
furnished" which constitute lens. A personal judgment may be entered. OKLA.
SrAT. ANN. tit. 52, S 501(a) (Supp. 1963).
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sale of Illinois land, 283 as well as personal injuries and encroachments. Noteworthy is the absence of any requirement that the defendant himself, or
his agent, ever have been in Illinois; a contract made in New York between
two New Yorkers for the sale of Illinois land would fall within the statute's
language. The interest of the State where land lies in questions affecting
its title is well established, 264 although many courts apply the law of the
place of making to determine the validity of a contract to sell land; 285 the
contact of buyer and seller with the State of situs is voluntary and probably
sufficient.
The Illinois statute, unlike those of Montana and Nevada, 26 applies
only to real and not to personal property. This is just as well. The New
Yorkers' contract for sale of Illinois property would be a good deal more
doubtful if it concerned personal property; 267 whatever the case as to real
estate, laws respecting transfers of personal property are probably designed
more for the protection of the rights of the individuals involved than for the
integrity of the title. A provision such as this that included personal property would also raise problems in the tort area; it might be construed to
apply, for example, to the California owner of an automobile whose bailee
unexpectedly drives to Illinois. In all probability most personal-property
cases in which Illinois jurisdiction would be appropriate will fall within the
268
provisions concerning torts or the transaction of business.
The Illinois real-property section has been the subject of only one reported decision. Porterv. Nahas 269 was an action by a landlord against defendants, now in New York, for damage done to premises leased to the
defendants in Illinois but since vacated. Probably jurisdiction could also
have been sustained for the commission of a tort in the State; but the court
quite correctly rejected the claim that a tenant for less than five years was
not an owner, possessor, or user of real estate. Apparently the claim was
based on the ancient notion that an interest in land for a term of years is

2,See Cleary, supra note 261, at 368. Cf. Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods.,
Inc., Wash. 2d-,
381 P.2d 245 (1963), in which jurisdiction over a broker who
had sold personal property located in Washington was denied.
mE.g, RSATEMLT, CoNFLIcr OF LAws S 215 (1934).
2 65
See EMKNzwEI
CoNrLIcr OF LAws 612-13 (1962); REsTATEMErNT, CoNFLicr
OF LAWS 5340 (1934).
mMoNrT. REv. CODES ANN. 93-2702-2B(l)(c)
(Supp. 1961); N-v. Rzv. STAT.
S 14.020 and S 14.030 (1961). The Nevada provision is not expressly limited, as are
the others of this sort, to actions arising from the use of the property, but for constitutional reasons it should be so construed.
See Developments at 947-48.
2 Wisconsin has certain specific provisions applicable to personal property
within the State, but they are carefully limited. Wis. STAT. ANN. 5S 262.05(6) (b),(c)
(Supp. 1963).
26935 IM. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1st Dist. 1962).
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personal property. This is a ridiculous contention in the context of the
purposes of section 17; the duration of the estate has nothing to do with
the justice of making the defendant return, or with the State's interest in
redressing injuries. Indeed one of the types of cases which make the provision particularly appropriate is an action against a former tenant, now departed, to recover unpaid rent. A comparable situation respecting personal
property, in which jurisdiction would also be proper, is an action by the
Illinois lessor of an automobile for nonpayment of charges. Probably this
could be considered the transaction of business in Illinois, even if the de270
fendant had rented the car for pleasure rather than profit.
"CONTRACTING

To.INSURE ANY

PERSON, PROPERTY OR RISK LOCATED

WITHIN THIS STATE AT THE TIME OF CONTRACTING"

The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1938 promulgated an
Unauthorized Insurers Act, which among other things provided for jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies in actions concerning policies
issued to citizens or residents of, or companies doing business in, the forum
State.27 ' A number of States have adopted this or similar provisions; it was a
similar California provision which was upheld in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co. 272 The Illinois statute is somewhat different; it authorizes
suit when the policy covers property in Illinois owned by a nonresident
not doing business here. Wisconsin has taken a still different tack, permitting insurance suits either if the insured was a Wisconsin resident "when
the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred"
or if "the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred
within this state, regardless of where the person insured resided." 273
Since there have been no Illinois or Wisconsin cases dealing with these
provisions, a detailed comparative analysis seems premature. All three
statutes, in accord with McGee, make it irrelevant where the contract was
made or whether the company sent agents into the State. Suffice it to say
that the Wisconsin provision, patterned in part upon comparable tort and
contract provisions in the Illinois and other statutes, is on more shaky
ground in insurance cases. Difficult choice-of-law problems arise when in-

27

Clearly enough the nonresident lessor of Illinois property, real or personal,
is engaging in "business" within the State. See Armi v. Huckabee, 266 Ala. 91, 94
So. 2d 380 (1957). The lessee, unless he rents for business purposes, is less certain.
Cf. IDAHo CODE ANN. S 5-514(a) (Supp. 1963), and notes 241-43 supra and accompanying text.
2T9C UlnOaiM LAws ANN. 306, 308 (1957).
272 355 U.S. 220, 78 Sup. Ct. 199 (1957), upholding CAL. INS. CODE §5 1610-20.
Other examples are ARK. STAT. ANN. S 66-244(a)

(1957);

MD. ANN. CoDE art. 48A,

§ 362(a)
(1957).
27 3
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(10) (Supp. 1963).
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sured property is taken into another State by a nonresident, or by one who
has become a resident after taking out the policy. Florida has applied her
own law to an insurance policy issued to a nonresident who later brought
his insured boat into Florida and suffered a loss there; 274 but it is questionable whether Florida laws are really designed, or can fairly be designed,
to apply to obligations between nonresidents concerning personal property
transiently within the State.27 5 Moreover, the problem of personal jurisdiction in such a case closely resembles Hanson v. Denckla,276 especially if the
insured has moved into the forum State after the contract was made. Like
the trustee in that case, the insurer's voluntary contact was with the State
where the settlor or the insured lived at the time; and, even more clearly than
in Hanson, where the trustee could resign presumably without any breach of
obligation, the company could not avoid its contract without liability. It is
arguable that an insurer of personal property, like the manufacturer of goods
in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,27 7 should anticipate in this mobile society that the property may be moved into another
State, especially when the property is an automobile or a boat. Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.278 is close authority for this; but there is still
a requirement of forum-State interest which may not be satisfied when the
injury is not to one of its residents by the foreign property, but to the
property itself. And even if the movement of personal property can fairly
be anticipated, there is a more serious question whether the same is true of
a change of residence; Hanson v. Denckla seems rather formidable authority
that it is not, at least for jurisdictional as contrasted with choice-of-law
purposes. 279 Accordingly, I think the Wisconsin provision goes too far in
extending to cases in which neither the risk nor the insured was located or
resident in the State when the contract was made. I am inclined to favor
the Uniform Law's requirement of residence in the State, properly in-

27

4 Schluter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 144 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1962).

275The Fifth Circuit held the application of Florida law unconstitutional where
not only did the loss occur in that State but the insured had moved there after taking
out the policy. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959). The Su-

preme Court sent the case to the Florida courts for a determination of state law,
stating that the constitutional question was a difficult one. 363 U.S. 207, 80A Sup.
Ct. 1222 (1960). The Florida court held its law applied, 133 So.2d 735 (1961), and
the Fifth Circuit has reasserted its view that as so applied the law violates due process.
319 F.2d 505 (1963). A petition for certiorari has been filed. 32 USJ,. Week 3103
(1963).

See B. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of

Laws, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258, 290-94 (1961).

276357 U.S. 235, 78 Sup. Ct. 1228 (1958).
-722 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
supra.
278348 U.S. 66, 75 Sup.Ct. 166 (1954).

See text accompanying notes 119-21

t S€ee Reese & Gglton, supra note 232, at 257.
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terpreted to require residence at the time of contract, for that seems to
assure in most cases both a State interest (but query, when the insured has
since moved away) and fair notice to the defendant. The Illinois provision
for a risk in the State at the time of insurance commendably avoids unfair
surprise to the defendant, but I am not certain the State has an interest in
applying its laws for the protection of all personal property in the State,
although quite frequently the choice will be appropriate.
OTHER MEANS OF ACQUIRING JURISDICTION

Section 17 is explicit that it in no way "limits or affects the right to
serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law."
This is understandable, since the legislature's purpose was to expand rather
than to limit jurisdiction, and since section 17 does not exhaust the appropriate bases of jurisdiction. Now that the task of expanding the State's
jurisdiction has been accomplished, however, it is appropriate to suggest that
some attention be given to limiting other heads of jurisdiction which do not
comport with modern conceptions of fair procedure.
The prevailing theory after Pennoyer v. Neff was not only that personal
service within the state was necessary for jurisdiction over the person, but
that it was sufficient as well. 280 It is sufficient today in Illinois 281 and elsewhere.2 82 Cases do not often arise in which this results in unfairness. Law
professors, however, like to hypothesize a case in which a nonresident is
served with summons while above the forum State in an airplane traveling
between points in other States. An enterprising marshal recently accomplished this feat in Arkansas, and jurisdiction was upheld without discussion
of whether the cause of action had any relation to the forum State.28 3 Since
then, a nonresident temporarily in Minnesota was served a summons to defend an action arising out of an Iowa collision, and the state supreme court
described his objection to jurisdiction as "frivolous." 284 There is nothing
frivolous about this objection. The assertion of jurisdiction in such cases
lingers from the days when defendants were arrested and brought to court;
it has no place in a system where jurisdiction is based upon fairness to the

280RETATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS S5 77-78 (1934).
See Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YAME
L.J. 289 (1956); Developments at 937-39 (1960).
281
sL. REV. STAT. c. 110, S 13.1(2) (1963), provides for service on defendants
"wherever they may be found in the State," and I have seen no indication that there
may be
cases in which such service will not be held to confer personal jurisdiction.
283
E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. S 262.05(1) (Supp. 1963), makes explicit provision for
this.
283 Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). In fact the Arkansas
contacts may have been sufficient.
2 Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 484, 119 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1963).
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defendant in the context of his acts and the interests of the forum State. 28 5
A related type of case capable of producing unfairness is the action
quasi in rem, sanctioned by Pennoyer v. Neff. This differs from the perfectly reasonable assertion of power by a State in which property is located either to determine its ownership or to adjudicate an action arising
out of its use or possession in the State; the property is seized and applied
to a totally unrelated obligation of a nonresident defendant, even when the
cause of action has nothing to do with the State. This is no more justifiable
than jurisdiction based on presence of the defendant alone; the fortuitous
presence of property in the State neither gives the State an interest in the
outcome of an unrelated transaction nor makes jurisdiction fair to the defendant. Quasi in rem jurisdiction at its worst has been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Balk,2s8 where the "property" of
the defendant "located" in the forum State was a debt owed to the defendant by another nonresident passing through the State. In other words,
one can be sued wherever his debtors happen to travel, as well as wherever
he himself goes. This is not made appreciably more fair by the fact that
recovery is limited to the value of the property in the forum State,2s7 especially in view of the common unconstitutional practice that the defendant
may enter to assert his constitutional right to contest the merits and protect
his property only on condition that he surrender his constitutional immunity
from a judgment binding him personally.288 The entire notion that attachment or garnishment can give a State jurisdiction over a cause of action
unrelated to the property seized, where no jurisdiction would otherwise
exist, should be rapidly abolished.
There remain for consideration the provision of section 16 for service
outside the State upon "a citizen or resident of this State" and that of section
13.3 for service upon "any officer or agent of [a] . . . corporation found

anywhere in the State." Neither of these provisions is limited to causes of
action arising from activities in or connected with this State. In regard to
individuals, it is not likely to be unfair to require a resident to defend an
action in his home State. But residence and citizenship are different matters.
Although service was upheld in Milliken v. Meyer 28 9 on the basis of the
defendant's domicile within the forum State, there may be some question
as to the fairness of this procedure in some cases. For a domiciliary or

2
S5Ehrenzweig, supra note 280; Developments 939. Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of
State Courts Over Nonresidents in Our Federal System, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 196, 208
(1957).
288 198 U.S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1905).
2
87Freeman v. Alderson, 119 US. 185, 190, 7 Sup. Ct. 165, 168 (1886).
See Developments at 953-55.
2311 US. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 339 (1940). See Developments at 941-43 (1960).
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"citizen," in the words of the Illinois statute, need not be a resident; one
who has not been in Illinois for fifty years is still a domiciliary of the State
unless he has formed the requisite intention of remaining elsewhere. As for
corporations, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co. 29° that the scope of activities of a corporation
required to subject it to suit on an unrelated cause of action is greater than
that required in the case of a claim arising from activities within the State.
Suit against a corporation where it does business, based upon an unrelated
cause of action, is analogous to a suit against a resident of the forum State
on an unrelated cause. But because many corporations do business in a
great many States, this practice is subject to abuse; it would be better if
fewer suits for accidents occurring in rural States were filed against railroads in distant urban centers where there is a tendency toward large jury
verdicts. I doubt this rises to the level of a violation of due process, and
forum non conveniens is available to check such abuses. Still it might be
preferable to make statutory provision excluding such suits when another
more suitable forum is available, at least unless the forum is the principal
place of the defendant's business.
CONCLUSION

I find section 17 to be a commendable and well-conceived measure. In
general it has been handled by the courts carefully and thoughtfully in the
spirit of its purposes. I do not seriously suggest that it be altered by the
legislature, but only that the courts, in interpreting it, avoid the temptation
to import technical distinctions as to the place where an act has taken place
and focus instead upon the relevant considerations of state interests
and hardship to the defendant. The decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court
in Nelson v. Miller and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. lit the way toward a salutary broad construction of the statute;
and that court's only retrogressive decision, Grobark v. Addo Macb. Co.,
seems in substance to have been overruled.
Finally, while I recognize that it is more difficult to induce a legislature
to curtail the State's power than to increase it, some limitations of the
existing statutory framework are now in order.

290 342 US. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413 (1952).
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